TRoPICALS: a computational embodied neuroscience model of compatibility effects by Caligiore, Daniele et al.
  
TRoPICALS: A Computational Embodied Neuroscience Model 
of Compatibility Effects 
 
Authors: 
Daniele Caligiore*+^, Anna M. Borghi+*, Domenico Parisi*, Gianluca Baldassarre*  
 
Affiliations: 
* Laboratory of Computational Embodied Neuroscience,  
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (LOCEN-ISTC-CNR) 
Via San Martino della Battaglia 44, I-00185 Roma, Italy 
Email: {daniele.caligiore, domenico.parisi, gianluca.baldassarre}@istc.cnr.it 
 
+ Embodied Cognition Laboratory (EMCO-Lab) 
Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Bologna 
Viale Berti Pichat 5, I-40127 Bologna, Italy 
Email: annamaria.borghi@unibo.it 
 
^ Biomedical Robotics and Biomicrosystem Lab 
Università Campus Biomedico 
Via Álvaro del Portillo 21, I-00128 Roma, Italy 
 
Keywords: embodied cognition; affordances; human and non-human primate cortex; dorsal and 
ventral cortical pathways; prefrontal cortex; dynamic field neural networks; language and 
simulation theory. 
 
Running head:         TRoPICALS: A model of compatibility effects
 Abstract 
Recent evidence shows that the perception of objects automatically activates the representation 
of their affordances. For example, some experiments found compatibility effects between the size of 
objects (small/large) and the kind of grip (precision/power) required to categorise them as natural or 
as artefacts, and between common location of object parts (top or bottom) and the kind of 
movement (up and down) required to indicate whether or not these parts belong to a whole object. 
This article presents a neural-network model that reproduces these results and also provides a 
general framework to account for several other types of compatibility effects. This model is based 
on four general principles: (a) visual perception and action are organised along a dorsal neural 
pathway (encoding affordances) and a ventral pathway; (b) within the ventral pathway, the 
prefrontal cortex biases action selection based on context and goals; (c) action selection results from 
neural dynamic competitions that cause variable reaction times; (d) words trigger “internal 
simulations” of their referents. The model was designed within a methodological approach that 
aims at developing it cumulatively so as to furnish increasingly general and comprehensive 
accounts of compatibility effects. The approach imposed four types of constraints on the model: (a) 
neuroscientific constraints on their architecture and functioning; (b) reproduction of specific 
psychological experiments; (c) functioning within an embodied system; (d) reproduction of the 
learning processes that result in the target behaviours. The claim on the generality of the model is 
supported by a critical comparison with other models that are related to the above four principles 
and by an analysis of how the model could be developed to account for other compatibility effects. 
The heuristic power of the model is also shown by presentating two testable predictions. 
 
 
TRoPICALS: A Computational Embodied Neuroscience 
Model of Compatibility Effects  
 
Title level 1: Introduction 
Title level 2: The role of actions in the internal representation of objects 
According to traditional views of cognition, perception precedes action and is not influenced by it. 
Sensory input determines how the world is represented in an organism’s nervous system whereas 
processes underlying action only play a role in how the organism modifies the environment. This 
passive, “contemplative”, view of knowledge, that has a long philosophical tradition, is increasingly 
challenged by recent studies which suggest that visual perception and action are closely 
interdependent and that the way organisms represent the world depends not only on sensory stimuli 
per se but also on the actions with which they respond to them (Gallese & Metzinger, 2003; 
Barsalou, 2003). 
Behavioural and brain imaging evidence indicates that visually perceived objects activate motor 
information. Seeing objects or pictures of objects elicits the actions that tend to be performed on or 
with objects. In this perspective, the notion of affordance (Gibson, 1979) has been given new 
relevance. An affordance can be described as a set of properties of an object which suggest possible 
actions and uses to an organism. An affordance is not an intrinsic property of an object, but rather a 
relational property: an object may provide different affordances depending on the features of the 
organism body and of the context. 
Jeannerod (1994) and Arbib (1997) proposed that objects tend to evoke actions which are 
appropriate to them and suggest that this process involves motor representations and their distal 
goals. Many behavioural and brain imaging studies on humans and animals have provided evidence 
showing that observation of objects activates their associated affordances.  Rizzolatti, Fogassi, and 
Gallese (1997) conducted a study with monkeys illustrating that the sight of objects tends to 
automatically evoke the activation of suitable neural representations in premotor cortex, a brain 
district believed to underlie action preparation (for example in relation to precision or power grip 
actions). However, the extent to which this activation occurs in an automatic bottom-up way or is 
modulated by the task itself is subject of debate (e.g., see Borghi et al., 2007; Castiello, 1999; 
Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Creem & Lee, 2005; de’ Sperati & Stucchi, 1997). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next two sections introduce the target 
experiments investigated with the model, and explain the goals of the work and the method used to 
build the model (“computational embodied neuroscience”). The succeeding group of sections 
illustrates the four general principles at the core of the model, the details of the three target 
experiments, and the body of the simulated robot used to reproduce them; moreover, they present in 
detail the architecture and functioning of the model, the neuroscientific evidence used to constrain 
them, and the learning processes used to train some components of the model. The article then 
presents the results of the tests directed to reproduce the three target experiments, their 
interpretation, and partial conclusions; these sections also report two specific predictions of the 
model which might be tested in real experiments.  A further group of sections extensively reviews 
other models which are related to the principles incorporated by the model, and shows how the 
model, if suitable developed, has the potential to account for many other compatibility effects (these 
sections can be skipped by the reader if not interested in these issues as they are rather independent 
of the rest of the paper). The article is closed by summarising the main achievements of the model. 
Title level 2: Affordances and compatibility effects investigated with the model 
One way of studying how internal representations of objects are related to action representations is 
to devise experimental tasks in which participants are exposed to objects and are asked to produce 
actions which are either in agreement (“compatible” or “congruent” trials) or in contrast 
(“incompatible” or “incongruent” trials) with the actions typically associated with the objects (e.g., 
grasping an object with the appropriate grip). For example, in compatible trials the participant is 
asked to execute a grip appropriate to the object size (e.g., a precision grip with a small object), 
whereas in incompatible trials the participant is asked to execute a grip which is not appropriate to 
the object size (e.g., a precision grip with a large object). If the participants employ longer reaction 
times (RTs) and higher error rates in incompatible trials than in compatible ones, one can infer that 
seeing objects automatically elicits the representations of their affordances. With the term 
“automatically” we refer to the fact that the representation of affordances of objects is elicited 
independently of the performance of the experimental task.  
Tucker and Ellis (2004) and Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) performed various 
experiments using a compatibility paradigm to investigate whether vision of objects or of words 
referring to them automatically activates action representations. In “Experiment 3, picture-mode” of 
Tucker and Ellis (2004), participants were asked to classify large and small image objects either 
into the category of artefacts or the category of natural objects. To perform the task they had to 
mimic either a precision or a power grip by acting on a customised joystick. Importantly, object size 
was not relevant to the task which simply requested categorizing the objects into “natural object” or 
“artefact”. The authors found a compatibility effect between the size of the object (large and small) 
and the motor response (power and precision grip). In particular, they observed shorter RTs in 
congruent trials (large objects and power grip; small objects and precision grip) than in incongruent 
ones (large objects and precision grip; small objects and power grip). 
In “Experiment 3, word-mode” of Tucker and Ellis (2004), the authors investigated the role of 
motor information during the processing of written names of objects. In these experiments the 
authors observed again an interaction between object size (large, small) and motor response (power, 
precision), even if object size was not relevant to the categorization task. Congruent trials caused 
shorter RTs, whereas incongruent trials produced longer RTs. Overall, the results of Tucker and 
Ellis (2004) show that knowledge of objects, independently of the fact that it is activated by images 
or words, relies not only on their perceptual features but also on the actions that can be performed 
on them, so the latter affects the behaviour of participants irrespective of their current goals. 
The “experiment 3” by Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak  (2004) aimed at studying whether 
reading sentences referring to objects automatically activates representations of the spatial features 
of objects and evokes the corresponding motor actions. Participants read a sentence referring to an 
object, for example “There is a doll on the table in front of you”, followed by a noun which could 
either refer to a part of the object in the sentence (e.g., “head”) or to something completely 
unrelated (e.g., “kindergarten”). Participants were asked  to decide whether the noun referred to a 
part of the object or not. In the “yes-is-up” condition, the participants were asked to click a button 
positioned at the top of a row of two buttons to replay “yes”, and a button positioned at the bottom 
of the row to reply “no”. In the “yes-is-down” condition the position of the buttons to be pressed 
was reversed. A compatibility effect was found when the object part was in the upper part of the 
whole object (e.g., “head”) RTs were faster in the “yes-is-up” than in the “yes-is-down” condition, 
as if upper parts evoked an upward movement. Similarly, object parts located in the lower part of 
the whole object (e.g., “feet”) evoked a downward movement producing the opposite effects. The 
experiment demonstrated that object names evoke information on the spatial location of object 
parts, and this affects motor responses, even if such information is not relevant for the experimental 
task. 
Title level 2: Aim of the study, constraints on designing the model, and methodological 
approach adopted 
The goal of this paper is to present a bio-constrained neural-network model which aims at providing 
a comprehensive computational account of experiments looking into compatibility effects. As a first 
step towards the achievement of this overall goal, the proposed model is used here to interpret the 
three experiments on compatibility effects and affordances illustrated in the previous section 
(Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004)X. 
The model has been designed on the basis of an approach which might be termed Computational 
Embodied Neuroscience as it is based on principles advocated by “embodied cognitive science” and 
“computational neuroscience” (other information on the approach can be found in Mannella, 
Mirolli, & Baldassarre, 2010; cf. Prescott, Montes-Gonzalez, Gurney, Humphries, & Redgrave, 
2006, for a similar but less principled approach). In particular, the model was built by trying to 
comply with four classes of constraints: (a) constraints deriving from the available knowledge on 
the anatomy and physiology of the brain structures underlying the behaviours of interest (e.g., 
based on Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998, Culham & Kanwisher, 2001, Simon, Mangin, 
Cohen, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002, and Grèzes, Tucker, Armony, Ellis, & Passingham, 2003); (b) 
constraints deriving from the requirement to accurately reproduce the behaviours observed in 
specific psychological experiments, for example in this case those from Tucker and Ellis (2004) and 
Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004); (c) constraints related to the requirement to reproduce the 
target behaviours within an embodied system ( with “embodied system” we refer to a “simulated 
participant” which interacts with the environment via realistic sensors and actuators as it happens 
for the human participants of the target experiments; for example, the model presented here 
perceives objects in terms of realistic RGB images, similar to eye vision, and performs actions on 
the basis of a simulated 3D human-like realistic arm and hand); (d) constraints related to the 
requirement that the model should reproduce and explain the learning processes leading the human 
participants to acquire the behaviours of the target experiments. 
Several methodological reasons motivated the use of these four classes of constraints. According 
to the computational neuroscience approach (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Arbib, 2002), it is 
important to translate theories of brain and behaviour into detailed computational models as this 
forces the experimenter to specify and make explicit vague or implicit assumptions of theories and 
also allows deriving specific falsifiable and often quantitative predictions from these theories. In 
addition, the use of the first two types of constraints is essential to allow selecting and developing 
models in a cumulative fashion. In particular, the first type of constraints (anatomical and 
physiological constraints) are important as one can always produce a number of alternative models 
that reproduce a given behaviour (behavioural constraints), so one is left without criteria to rank and 
select the models. On the contrary, if one tries to design a model by deriving its architecture and 
functioning from detailed anatomical and physiological data, the range of possibilities for 
reproducing the target behaviours and cognitive processes drastically decreases. The support of 
theories of cognition and behaviour from neuroscientific evidence (particularly in the area of 
localisation of cognitive functions in the brain) is also a fundamental methodological principle 
endorsed by cognitive neuroscience (Posner, Pea, & Volpe, 1982; Posner & Di Girolamo, 2000). In 
line with cognitive neuroscience, one of the strong values of the model presented here, and of 
computational models in general, is that it accounts for cognitive and behavioural targeted 
phenomena in terms of low-level neural mechanisms. Explanations based on low-level mechanisms 
usually have the advantage of being more general and of offering more predictions than the 
explanations provided at a higher functional level. 
The third type of constraints (“embodiment” constraints) are in line with embodied cognitive 
science and the simulation of adaptive behaviour approaches (Meyer & Wilson, 1991; Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Webb, 1995; Webb, 2009). These state that a real understanding of 
cognitive processes can only come from computational models which view organisms as entities 
possessing an entire body (Brooks, 1989) and engaging in interactions with a realistic environment 
through realistic sensors and actuators (Clark, 1997). As we shall see, for example, these type of 
constraints allow the model presented here (a) to have realistic differentiated internal 
representations of objects in the dorsal and ventral pathways and (b) to control actions on the basis 
of specific sensorimotor neural transformations. This contributes to explaining some of the results 
of the target experiments. 
 In line with embodied cognitive science, and also with the Artificial Life approach, the fourth 
source of constraints (“learning” constraints) derive from the idea that a full understanding of 
behaviour requires not only explaining its final organisation but also the ontogenetic processes, and 
possibly also the phylogenetic processes, that lead to its development and evolution (Parisi & 
Schlesinger, 2002; Webb, 2009). 
The approach used here is also guided by the fundamental “meta-constraint” of theoretical 
cumulativity. This meta-constraint consists to avoid producing ad-hoc models which account for 
only specific single experiments and to aim at producing general models that account for an 
increasing number of experiments related to a certain class of target cognitive, behavioural, and 
neural phenomena so as to incorporate a progressively larger number of constraints. This effort is 
expected to lead to isolate the general principles underlying the class of studied phenomena and 
hence to produce theoretical cumulativity. The importance of theoretical cumulativity resides in the 
fact that psychology and neuroscience are accumulating a huge body of evidence on detailed 
phenomena related to cognition, brain, and behaviour, but they often fail to produce coherent and 
unified theoretical accounts of these phenomena. We consider theoretical cumulativity the most 
significant added value that the computational models can produce with respect to our 
understanding of cognition, behaviour, and brain (the need to produce general theories is in line 
with what stated by other researchers, for example Newell, 1973). The model described in the paper 
reproduces only some specific experimental results but our emphasis on cumulativity and generality 
with which it has been designed implies that the same model can also be applied, with the necessary 
modifications, to other experimental and ecological behavioural evidence (see last sections on this). 
A last important observation with respect to the method used here regards the neuroscientific 
detail of the model presented here. The model is a system-level model. This implies that, from a 
neuroscientific perspective, the main goal of it is to provide an operational hypothesis of the 
cerebral “network of networks” which underlies compatibility effects (i.e., the system formed by a 
network of brain areas each in turn formed by a network of neurons). This sides with the 
perspective adopted here which postulates that the different classes of behaviours are generated by 
the interplay of different subsets of components of the brain rather than by specific components in 
isolation. For this reason, the single components of the brain, and hence of the model, can be more 
accurately characterised in terms of computational mechanisms rather than functions. For example, 
the premotor cortex components of the model can be characterised in terms of the “neural 
competition” they perform. Whereas the function of “action-selection” they implement, ascribed to 
them in various parts of the paper for ease of reference and to aid understanding, depends on the 
information they get from afferent areas and on the effects they cause on downstream areas and 
motor systems. In line with this, the model takes into consideration ten brain areas whereas neural 
network models usually focus on the specific functions of two-three areas (although there are 
notable exceptions, e.g., Fagg & Arbib, 1998, and Oztop & Arbib, 2002). This allowed us to outline 
an integrated hypothesis on the system-level architectural and functioning brain mechanisms which 
might underlie compatibility effects. Indeed, all four of the principles which specify such a 
hypothesis capture rather high-level mechanisms. 
A caveat, however, is that this approach led us to represent the single components of the model 
with neural networks (dynamic-field neural networks and Kohonen neural networks) which are 
rather abstract with respect to the brain micro-circuits and the functioning of neurons. In this 
respect, however, due to the general biological plausibility of the neural networks used to design the 
model (cf. Kohonen, 1997; Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002), it should be possible to improve the realism 
of the micro-architecture and functioning of the components of the model without changing much 
of its overall architecture and core functioning principles. 
Title level 1: TRoPICALS: principles, architecture, functioning, and learning 
Title level 2: The four core principles at the basis of the model 
Figure 1 illustrates the general functions implemented by the model and the putative brain areas 
involved in such functions (these will be further explained below). The model is based on four 
general principles: (a) the two-route organisation of the visual system and, more generally, of an 
important portion of the brain, relying upon a ventral and a dorsal neural pathway;  (b) the guidance 
of action selection on the basis of prefrontal cortex “instructions”;  (c) the selection of actions on 
the basis of a competition between different affordances based on such prefrontal bias;  (d) the 
capability of language to trigger internal simulations of the referents of words. For this reason, the 
model is called “TRoPICALS”, an acronym which stands for the four principles: Two Route, 
Prefrontal Instruction, Competition of Affordances, Language Simulation model (the acronym also 
hints at the potential of the model to be developed in a cumulative fashion so as to account for an 
increasing number of compatibility effects, similar to “tropicals”, the tropical plants which tend to 
grow in a layered fashion). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: First principle: two neural pathway organisation 
This principle concerns the broad organisation of brain cortex responsible for visual processing into 
the dorsal and ventral neural pathways.  This theory was initially proposed by Ungerleider and 
Mishkin (1982). In the original proposal, the ventral stream is a neural pathway which runs from 
early visual cortex areas (VC) to inferotemporal cortex (ITC) and carries information about the 
identity of objects (“what” pathway). The dorsal stream is a neural pathway which runs from VC to 
the parietal cortex (PC) and processes spatial information, concerning the location of objects in the 
visual field (“where”). The scope of this theory was later extended (Goodale & Milner, 1992; 
Milner & Goodale, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 2008) by proposing that the ventral stream 
communicates visual information to support higher cognitive processing taking place in 
downstream cortical areas (e.g., not only object recognition but also decision making on actions to 
be executed, and higher-level reasoning). In contrast, the dorsal stream transfers visual information 
to support on-line performance of actions in downstream motor cortex areas (e.g., not only location 
of objects, but also identification of their shape and implementation of the sensorimotor 
transformations needed for visually guided actions). Note that although the ventral and dorsal 
components are rather segregated their segregation is not complete. In fact the information 
processed by the two pathways is partially integrated not only in the late frontal stages of 
sensorimotor information flow, but also through connections existing between early visual stages 
(Rolls & Deco, 2002) and in the PC (Gallese, Craighero, Fadiga, & Fogassi, 1999). 
Based on the above ideas, the architecture of the model includes a first component that 
corresponds to the sensorimotor dorsal pathway. This pathway is formed by a first group of three 
“maps” of artificial neurons abstracting the visual pre-processing performed by VC. Then it is 
formed by two other maps which abstract some of the functions implemented by the PC, here 
responsible for extracting the shape and location of objects. Finally, it is formed by two further 
maps which abstract some of the functions implemented by the premotor cortex (PMC), in 
particular they contribute to the selection and preparation of grasping and reaching actions. Overall, 
the dorsal pathway is assumed to encode the “affordances” of objects, i.e. to implement information 
processes related to actions which can be successfully executed on objects. 
In primates, information on affordances can be learned during the first months of life, and 
refined later in life, based on processes such as “motor babbling” (von Hofsten, 1982; Ognibene et 
al., 2006; Caligiore et al., 2008), also called “direct inverse modelling” (Kuperstein, 1988). This 
process consists in the production of various motor acts which allow the acquisition of basic useful 
associations between representations in sensorial and motor areas (Piaget, 1952). In the model 
presented here, motor babbling processes are used to mimic what might happen in early stages of 
development. In these stages, for example, children learn to form associations between the 
perceived position in space of an object held with an hand and the corresponding posture assumed 
by the arm and the hand holding it. The knowledge acquired in this way allows the performance of 
goal-directed reaching movements in later stages of life (e.g., in psychological experiments as those 
simulated here). In fact the selection of a target with eyes allows retrieving the internal 
representation of the correspondent posture of the arm and hand and this can then guide movements 
towards such posture. 
The skills implemented by the dorsal pathway have the advantage of allowing highly familiar 
motor behaviours to be executed quickly and automatically (for example, a simple automatic 
manipulative behaviour such as the tendency to grasp a large object with a power grip and a small 
object with a precision grip) and can develop gradually as learning mechanisms form suitable 
cortical patterns. These skills are rather rigid and stereotyped, for example they tend to always lead 
to the automatic execution of actions corresponding to the most active affordances. In this respect, 
Borghi and Riggio (2009) have proposed that humans activate object motor prototypes 
corresponding to the most frequently used affordances (e.g., the size and key parts of objects, such 
as the handles). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Second principle: prefrontal cortex instructions 
This principle concerns the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) as a source of top-down biasing 
which instructs and informs the neural competitions between potential actions that compete for 
expression in behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Cisek, 2007). The sensory system of primates 
provides detailed information about the external world and as a result of this their motor system can 
acquire a large repertoire of actions. This introduces a great potential for flexibility but also for 
interference. To effectively cope with the multitude of possible actions to perform, the brain has 
acquired mechanisms that coordinate low-level sensory and motor processes on the basis of internal 
motivations, goals, and external context (Fuster, 1997; Fuster, 2001). PFC plays a key role in these 
processes especially when “top-down” control based on motivations and goals is needed (Fuster, 
2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001). 
PFC also exhibits a high degree of plasticity. At the neural level, the mechanisms that underlie 
this plasticity could involve the modification of synapses, possibly with the assistance of rapid 
learning processes taking place in the hippocampus (Rolls & Treves, 1998). PFC can perform these 
functions in a more flexible way than lower sensorimotor processes, for example it can learn 
behavioural sequences “on the fly” (in humans it can do this on the basis of reciprocal 
interconnections with language areas, Pulvermüller, 2005) and it can store context in working 
memory so that it can suitably switch the “rules” of the produced behaviour in correspondence to 
relevant events (Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2007; Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001). 
This higher flexibility and context sensitivity of PFC allows it to strongly bias action selection 
when the multimodal richness of information and external/internal context requires to suitably 
modulate action instead of acting on the basis of habits and automatic tendencies (e.g., see also the 
literature on goal-driven behaviour, e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998, and Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 
2005). To this purpose, it is important that PFC can rely upon mechanisms that allow it to overcome 
the low-level automatic resonances when needed (e.g., the model proposed here uses strong “top-
down” connections linking PFC to motor areas). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Third principle: affordance competition 
This principle states that decision making and action selection are processes which rely on brain 
cortex connectivity such that neurons taking part in common representations are linked through 
excitatory connections whereas neurons belonging to different representations are linked through 
inhibitory connections (Ts’o, Gilbert, & Wiesel, 1986; Georgopoulos, 1995; Sparks & Groh, 1995; 
Bastian, Riehle, Erlhagen, & Schöner, 1998). Due to this connectivity, neuron clusters encoding 
different alternatives compete against each other and only the cluster receiving the strongest signals 
from other brain areas within a certain time frame survives. These signals carry “evidence” (or 
“support”) in favour of the different clusters whereas the competitive neural mechanisms work as a 
“clearing” mechanism which allows one cluster to prevail on others. 
This view of the functioning of decision making and action selection is in agreement with the 
neurobiological findings of Cisek and Kalaska (2005) who show that competing actions elicit 
competing activations at the level of frontal cortex until the activation of the selected action is the 
only one to  remain. Cisek (2007) proposes that such competition is based on a biasing effect 
produced by the prefrontal cortex (see second principle) and basal ganglia. In this respect, note that 
the actual competition based on reciprocal inhibition of competing clusters might actually take 
place within the frontal cortex (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005), within the basal ganglia (Redgrave, 
Prescott, & Gurney, 1999), or within whole systems formed by basal ganglia/cortical loops 
(including PFC, Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000). For simplicity, we will refer to the competition 
as taking place within the cortex but this does not intend to exclude the other possibilities. 
Brain processes underlying action selection and decision making can be reproduced with the 
dynamic neural field models. These models are usually implemented on the basis of neural maps (or 
“neural fields”; Amari, 1977; Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). Such models are strongly related to the 
“population code models” (Zemel, Dayan, & Pouget, 1998; Tipper, Howard, & Houghton , 2000; 
Pouget & Latham, 2002), also usually based on neural maps, and to the “leaky competing 
accumulator models” (Usher & McClelland, 2001; Bogacz, Usher, Zhang, & McClelland, 2006), 
which implement the principle of the competition based on reciprocal inhibition between discrete 
neural representations instead of neural fields. An important outcome produced by the use of these 
types of models to mimic decision making and action selection is that they naturally exhibit RTs 
which can be compared with empirical data. This is an important advantage for modelling because 
in cognitive psychology the independent variables measured in experiments are often the reaction 
times of participants. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Fourth principle: language-triggered simulations 
This principle is related to the language associative mechanism with which the model starts to give 
an account of the compatibility effects found with object names. This mechanism is implemented 
through a Hebbian correlation learning rule which creates associations between arbitrary patterns of 
active neurons representing the phonological aspects of words and internal “simulations” (e.g., the 
representations of the categories of objects and the representations of the aspects of objects that 
guide action, such as their shape and location). Note that the notion of “simulation” has been 
defined in different ways (for a detailed analysis of this concept, see Borghi & Cimatti, 2010, and 
Pezzulo, 2008; for a review, see Decety and Grezes, 2006). Here we define simulation (as in 
Jeannerod, 2007) as the offline recruitment (for instance, during language processing) of the same 
neural networks involved in perception and action. In addition, we qualify it (as in Gallese, 2009) as 
an embodied and automatic mechanism which can also allow one to understand others’ behaviours. 
Although very simple, this way of representing the effects of language is in line with other more 
articulated theoretical proposals such as the Indexical Theory (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000) and, 
more recently, the Language And Situated Simulation (LASS) theory (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, 
& Wilson, 2008; Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008). The indexical hypothesis by 
Glenberg and Robertson (2000) explains how words are linked to perceptual and motor information 
related to their referents. The idea is that a word like “dog” partially re-activates the multi-modal 
representations that are acquired during experience with dogs. Thus, according to this theory, given 
the tight relationship between perception and action, words evoke object affordances (Gibson, 
1979) and affordances do not only influence the understanding of single words but also more 
complex linguistic structures such as sentences. Similarly, according to the LASS theory (Barsalou, 
Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008), when a 
word is perceived the brain activates the internal representations corresponding to its auditory or 
visual form and this causes the activation of other similar representations associated to other words 
(e.g., because such words have been often heard or seen in temporal conjunction). Such direct 
associations allow the system to tackle some simple tasks such as some word/nonword lexical 
decision problems which require a “superficial processing” (e.g., to solve word-nonword tasks 
where nonwords are clearly distinguishable from words). At a later stage (which can nevertheless 
take place very fast, i.e. within 200 ms as shown in Pulvermüller, 2005, or even faster, as shown by 
Boulenger et al., 2008), such neural representations of the sound or visual form of words act as 
pointers to “semantic” knowledge stored as “situated simulations”. This means that they activate 
perceptual, motor, emotional and other brain-state patterns which are also activated by the actual 
interactions with the referents of the words in the world. Note that this theory is closely related to 
the Dual Code Theory (Paivio, 1971; Paivio, 1986) and is very similar to the revised version of such 
theory presented by Glaser (1992), for example in terms of associations between early 
representations of words, timing of the activation of such representations, and brain patterns 
underlying simulations. Of course language is a very complex human ability and these models only 
capture some aspects of this ability. For example, words do not simply evoke the neural 
representation of objects but they can modify its nature (see Mirolli & Parisi, 2005 for a model on 
this). Moreover, models based on internal simulations might have problems in explaining how 
abstract words, which do not refer to perceivable objects, can be represented (Barsalou, 2003; 
Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008). 
Title level 2: The three target psychological experiments and their simulation  
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Experiment using object images 
In one of the experiments reported by Tucker and Ellis (2004) where the stimuli were object images 
(for ease of reference this experiment will be henceforth called “experiment with images”), 
participants were requested to perform a categorization task, namely to distinguish between pictures 
of natural and artefact objects, by using different grips, namely precision vs. power grip. To indicate 
whether the seen object was an artefact or a natural object, participants mimicked either a precision 
or a power grip with one hand by acting upon a device similar to a joystick. In particular, one group 
of participants was instructed to use a power grip to classify objects as natural and a precision grip 
to classify objects as artificial; a second group of participants was instructed to use the opposite 
associations (“power-artificial” and “precision-natural”). During the experiment, the RTs of the 
participants were recorded. 
To clarify the goal of the experiment, suppose that seeing an object automatically evokes the 
actions to interact with it, such as a grasp action suitable for the object size and shape. For example, 
seeing an apple likely activates the representation of its size and shape and prepares to the 
production of a power grasp. This preparation should facilitate a categorization response (e.g., 
deciding that the object is a natural one) performed with a power grip and interfere with a 
categorization response performed with a precision grip. 
The simulations aimed at reproducing this procedure but simplified secondary aspects of it. The 
“simulated participant” could see eight different objects drawn from the original experimental set: 
four natural objects (apple, potato, grape, raisin), and four artificial objects (cup, mallet, eraser, 
needle). These eight objects differed in their colour, shape, and size (four were relatively large, i.e. 
graspable with a power grip, and four were relatively small, i.e. graspable with a precision grip). In 
the simulated experiments, the nervous system of 20 participants was simulated by using 20 
different neural networks having different randomly-drawn initial connection weights. Half of the 
participants (first group) were trained to respond with a power grip when they saw a natural object 
and with a precision grip when they saw an artefact, whereas the other half of participants (second 
group) were trained for the opposite associations. After this training, the RTs of the participants 
were recorded after blocking all learning processes. 
In contrast with the laboratory conditions, before undergoing the experiment the simulated 
participant first learned to associate a suitable kind of grip (e.g., a precision one) to each  object 
(e.g., an eraser). This learning procedure was used to mimic what happens in everyday life, in 
particular in early years, when individuals learn to suitably respond to affordances of objects. Note 
that this is an essential element of the explanation of the compatibility effects presented here. Such 
an explanation relies on the hypothesis that the automatic reactivation of internal representations of 
affordances is acquired before the psychological experiment is carried out. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Experiment using words 
In a further experiment Tucker and Ellis (2004) asked participants to undertake the object 
categorization task mentioned above by reading names of objects on a computer monitor instead of 
seeing their images (for ease of reference, this will be called “experiment with words”). The goal of 
the experiment was to evaluate if compatibility effects can be activated not only by the sight of 
objects but also by verbal stimuli. 
This experiment was replicated with 20 simulated participants by following a procedure that was 
similar to the one used to replicate the experiment with images but with the following differences. 
During life each participant learned to suitably grasp the objects and also to associate the names of 
objects with their shape and identity. During the experiment, the participant learned to trigger a 
power or precision grip on the basis of the names of objects (without seeing their images). After this 
training the RTs of the participants were recorded after blocking all the learning processes. Note 
that the simulated participants “heard” the object names instead of reading them: this was based on 
the assumption that read words activate the internal auditory representation of words. This 
simplification was introduced to avoid building a sophisticated visual system for word reading 
which would have been overly complex but not relevant for the goals of this research. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Experiment using object parts 
In one of the experiments reported in Borghi et al (2004) (for ease of reference this will be called 
“experiment with object parts”), participants sat in front of a computer screen and responded using a 
response-box where the buttons were arranged from top to bottom. First they read a sentence related 
to an object being in a particular orientation, for example “There is a car in front of you”, and then 
they pressed the central button to see the name of another object on the screen (e.g., “roof”, 
“wheels”, or “parking place”). The task was to verify if the object in the sentence included the 
second object as one of its parts: in the “yes-is-up” condition, the participants had to press the upper 
button to indicate “yes” and to press the lower button to indicate “no”. In the “yes-is-down” 
condition the response mapping was reversed. During the experiment, RTs were recorded. 
The results of the experiment revealed that during language comprehension words work as cues 
that assist in accessing spatial information (such as the location of the object parts) and related 
action information (such as how to interact with the object and its parts). For example, the word 
“roof” related to “car” activates a spatial representation of the roof with respect to the car and so 
prepares one to interact with it by moving the hand up. This preparation facilitates a “yes response” 
in the yes-is-up condition and interferes with it in the yes-is-down condition. 
To replicate this experiment, 20 simulated participants were presented with the names of two 
large objects (“car”, “doll”; for ease of reference these will be called “whole objects”), four parts of 
them (“roof”, “wheels”, “head”, “feet”; for ease of reference these will be called “object parts”), 
and two unrelated objects (“plum”, “mandarin”; these were not used in the original test but were 
used here to check that the system could also learn to reach objects located in a central position 
within the working space). During the experiment, half of the participants (first group) were trained 
to respond with a yes-is-up reaching movement whereas the other half of the participants (second 
group) were trained to respond with a yes-is-down reaching movement. In this way, half of the 
times participants from both groups had to perform a response towards a button located in a 
position congruent with the position of the object part normally experienced during life, and the 
other half of the times they had to perform a response towards a button located in a position 
incongruent with it. After this training, the participants’ RTs were recorded after blocking all 
learning processes. 
Similarly to what happened in the experiments with images and words, and before undergoing 
the experimental training and test, the simulated participants learned to associate a suitable kind of 
reaching (e.g., moving up) to the images of the parts of the objects shown in a commonly-
experienced position (e.g., moving to a central position to reach the “car” and the “plum”, moving 
up to reach the “roof”, and moving down to reach the “wheels”). This learning phase also allowed 
the participants to form associations between the names of objects and the neural internal 
representations of both their commonly-experienced spatial location and category. 
Title level 2: The body of the simulated participants 
The neural network model controlled the body of a 3D simulated participant endowed with a visual 
system, a human-like 3-segments/4-DOFs arm, and a 21-segments/19-DOFs hand (Figure 2). The 
simulated participant’s arm and hand had the same parameters of the humanoid robot iCub 
(http://www.icub.org). The simulator was built on the basis of the 3D physics simulation library 
NewtonTM. The visual system of the participant was formed by a simulated “eye” (a 630×630 pixel 
RGB camera with a 120° pan and a 120° tilt angle, see Figure 2).  This was mounted 25 cm above 
the shoulder, leaned forward 10 cm, and looked down at the working plane where the arm 
performed actions. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert XX Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The eye was controlled by a hardwired “focussing reflex” that led it to foveate the barycentre of 
objects with a specified red or green or blue colour. In particular, each of the desired pan and tilt 
angles of the eye was computed as follows: 
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where a is the pan or tilt angle to be computed at time t, 315 is the centre of one dimension of the 
image (in pixels), 630 is the image size (in pixels), c is the weighted average of the (x, y) position 
within the retina (ranging in [-315, 315]) of the pixels having the desired colour (the average has 
weights equal to the activation of the pixels), and 120 is the movement range of the camera in each 
dimension (in degrees). The reflex is in line with the current neuroscientific literature suggesting 
that primates tend to foveate the target objects with which they interact and that their brain tends to 
exploit gaze centred reference frames for sensorimotor coordination (see Shadmehr & Wise, 2005, 
for a review). 
During the experiments with images and with words, the system was exposed to eight different 
objects (their images, or their images and names, respectively in the two experiments): two large 
natural objects (apple: diameter 36 mm; potato: 32 mm), two small natural objects (grape: 11 mm; 
raisin: 10 mm), two large artefacts (cup 34 mm, mallet: 30 mm), and two small artefacts (needle: 4 
mm; eraser: 10 mm). These objects are shown in Figure 4 X. 
During the experiment with object parts, the system was exposed to eight different objects (their 
images and their names): two whole objects (car: positioned in the working plane at -10 cm to the 
left of the shoulder and 20 cm in front of it; doll: -10 cm, 25 cm), four object parts (roof: -10 cm, 30 
cm; wheels: -10 cm, 15 cm; head: -10 cm, 30 cm; feet: -10 cm, 15 cm), and two “unrelated” objects 
(plum: -10 cm, 20 cm;  mandarin: -10 cm, 20 cm). These objects are shown in Figure 13. 
Note that the fact that the object parts were shown in isolation amounts to assuming that the system 
could filter out the other parts of the “whole object” on the basis of a suitable object-based attention 
mechanism not explicitly simulated here (Logan, 1996; Roelfsema, Lamme, & Spekreijse, 1998). 
During the simulated experiments, the system was asked to reach three “buttons”, in particular three 
positions in space located at -10 cm to the left of the shoulder and respectively 30, 20, and 10 cm in 
front of it. 
To simplify the analysis of results, the images encoded in the visual units of the system were 
caused only by the objects and not by the hand. This amounts to assuming that the system could 
also filter out the hand on the basis of the object-based attention mechanism mentioned above. In 
this respect, it is relevant that seeing an object is sufficient to activate the representations of its 
affordances in the PC and pre-activate motor neurons in PMC (in particular, “canonical neurons”; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Martin, 2007; Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008). 
In the experiments with images and with words, the model controlled only 2-DOFs of the hand: 
one for the thumb, whose DOFs were all controlled proportionally to a first command issued by the 
model, and one for the four same-sized fingers, controlled as a whole “virtual finger” proportionally 
to a second command issued by the model (cf. Arbib, 2002). In these experiments, the DOFs of the 
wrist and arm were kept still as requested by the tasks of the target experiments.  During the 
simulation of the participants’ interactions with objects during life, objects were kept fixed in space 
to avoid that they slipped away from fingers during closure, similar to what happens in grasping 
objects placed on a horizontal plane. 
In the experiment with object parts, which required reaching for different buttons located at 
different positions organised from top to bottom on a table in front of the participants, the model 
controlled only 2-DOFs of the arm and so worked on the plane. In this experiment the DOFs of the 
wrist and hand were kept to fixed angles so to have the hand aligned with the forearm in a straight 
position suitable for reaching the buttons, as requested by the task. 
The activation of the grasping output map of the model (lateral premotor cortex - PMCl) encoded 
the desired hand posture, whereas the reaching output map of the model (dorsal premotor cortex  - 
PMCd) encoded the desired arm posture. These postures were used to set the hand and arm “muscle 
models” in terms of “equilibrium points” (Feldman, 1986; Flanagan, Ostry, & Feldman, 1993). In 
particular, similarly to what done by Berthier, Rosenstein, and Barto (2005), single muscle models 
were simulated as simple Proportional Derivative controllers (PDs; these models capture the main 
elastic and damping properties of muscles, cf. also Bullock & Grossberg, 1989). The equation of a 
PD controller is as follows (Sciavicco & Siciliano, 1996): 
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where T is the vector of muscle torques applied to the joints, Kp is a diagonal matrix with elements 
equal to 300, q~  is the difference vector between the desired angular positions and the current 
angular positions of joints, KD is a diagonal matrix with elements equal to 10, and q  is the vector of 
current angular speed joints. The use of this abstract muscle model implies that the difference 
between the desired joint angles set by the system and the actual joint angles is used to set a 
proportional torque which diminishes such a difference. In addition to this, the model also generates 
a torque opposite to the movement and proportional to the joint angular speed which results in a 
dumping effect which increases arm stability. The action of the PDs was also assumed to be 
integrated by a gravity compensation mechanism here implemented by simply ignoring the effects 
of gravity on the arm and hand. 
Title level 2: TRoPICALS: Neuroscientific constraints, architecture, and functioning 
This section has two goals. First, it reviews the neuroscientific literature which was used to 
constrain the overall architecture of TRoPICALS, in particular to decide which components to 
include in the model and which particular function to assign to them. This review is introduced now 
and then developed in the following sub-sections in relation to the specific components of the 
model. Secondly, it illustrates (in the sub-sections) how the functions of the brain areas included in 
the model were “translated” into specific computational mechanisms. Figure 3 shows the 
architecture of the model. The model is formed by ten components each corresponding to a brain 
area and represented by a neural map of 21×21 neurons. 
The choice of the components of the architecture of the model used in the first and second 
experiment is broadly constrained on the basis of brain imaging evidence provided by Grèzes, 
Tucker, Armony, Ellis, and Passingham (2003). Their work shows that portions of parietal, 
premotor, temporal, and frontal cortex of humans performing the experiment of Tucker and Ellis 
(2004) are active during its execution. The architecture of the model is also constrained at a finer 
level on the basis of other sources of information on the various brain areas corresponding to the 
model components. The main sources of information used to draw these constraints are reported in 
Table 1. This table also shows the additional constraints used to formulate the extended version of 
the model presented in Figure 17. 
The architecture of the model is formed by a dorsal neural pathway and a ventral neural pathway. 
The dorsal pathway is in turn formed by two pathways: (a) a visual-parietal-premotor pathway 
underlying grasping behaviour; (b) a somatosensory-parietal-premotor pathway underlying reaching 
behaviours (Matelli, Luppino, Murata, & Sakata, 1994). In this respect, several physiological 
experiments with monkeys have shown that there are parietal-premotor neural pathways that receive 
their input from visual and somatosensory areas and control “grasping” (i.e., the movements of the 
hand; Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998) “reaching” (i.e., the movements of the proximal arm; 
Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997), and “overt attention” (i.e., the movements of the 
eye; Colby & Goldberg, 1999). These pathways usually involve partially segregated sub-areas of 
the parietal and the premotor cortex and form whole functional systems dedicated to the control of 
different “actuators” or portions of them (Rizzolatti, & Luppino, 2001). These pathways have 
homologues in human cortical areas which subserve similar functions, as shown by various 
experiments based on brain imaging techniques (Culham & Kanwisher, 2001, Simon, Mangin, 
Cohen, Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002). 
In the model, the ventral visual-prefrontal-premotor pathway integrates information about object 
category and context (in particular, the “experimental context” vs. the “ecological context”, see 
below) to exert a top-down control on action. In the brain, the ventral pathway involves cortical 
areas performing high-level visual processing (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Van Essen et al., 
2001; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004). This information reaches various areas of PFC and provides 
them with information for setting high-level goals and sub-goals of action (Fuster, 2001). 
Interestingly, various frontal areas (e.g., both PFC and PMC areas) are also the target of phonetic 
information originating from the auditory compartments of the superior temporal cortex (Romanski 
et al., 1999). In humans, this connectivity might allow frontal areas (and especially PFC ones) to 
integrate visual and linguistic information so as to exert a suitable top-down control on action 
(Pulvermüller, 2005), as assumed by the model presented here. 
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Emphasised heading of paragraph: Visual cortex (VC): encoding of object edges 
In the monkey (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991, Van Essen et al., 2001) and the human brain (Van 
Essen et al., 2001, Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Lerner, Hendler, Ben-Bashat, Harel, & Malach, 
2001), early stages of the visual cortex (VC) are organised hierarchically. This hierarchy underlies a 
processing of visual information which leads to extracting increasingly abstract information from 
visual images, from simple edge detection (Hubel, 1988) to complex feature recognition (Vinberg 
& Grill-Spector, 2008). Information elaborated in VC is important for both object recognition 
processes taking place in the ventral pathway and for the sensorimotor transformations guiding 
action and taking place in the dorsal pathway (see below). 
In the model, VC is formed by three maps and receives the visual signal supplied by a simulated 
camera. In particular, the neurons of the three maps have an activation which ranges in [0, 1] and 
encode information about shape and colour of the foveated object obtained through three distinct 
Sobel filters (Sobel & Feldman, 1968), one for each map. Each filter performs edge detection on the 
basis of the image of the object formed by only one colour (either red, green, or blue). These 
processes represent edge detection performed by the retina and by the succeeding early stages of the 
visual cortex in primates. The model assumes that the eye always foveates the target on the basis of 
the focussing reflex. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Somatosensory cortex (SSC): encoding of eye posture 
In  monkey (Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997) and human 
brain (Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002; Culham & Kanwisher, 2001), the 
associative parietal cortex areas that form the parietal-premotor pathways which control movements 
of the hand, the arm, and the eye get important information from the somatosensory cortex (SSC). 
Such parietal areas implement important visuomotor transformations suitable for the control of 
various actuators via their connections to PMC. In this respect, information from SSC allows the PC 
to suitably adjust visual information with respect to different reference frames on the basis of the 
state of relevant parts of the body (e.g., the position of the head with respect to the arm while this is 
controlled; Andersen, Snyder, Bradley, & Xing, 1997; Colby, 1998; Platt & Glimcher, 1999; 
Shadmehr & Wise, 2005). Proprioception might also furnish the parietal cortex information readily 
usable for action. For example, in normal conditions participants performing a reaching action 
usually fixate the target object with the eyes. The gaze direction thus furnishes a “clean” 
information on the object position which is readily usable by the arm (Allport, 1987; Balkenius, 
2000; DeSouza et al., 2000). 
In line with this, the SSC component of the model encodes the proprioception of the eye in terms 
of its gaze direction angles. These allow the PC-PMC pathway controlling the arm to know the 
position in space of the target of the reaching action. In particular, the neurons of SSC have 
different “preferred” gaze angles assigned to them on the basis of their positions in the neural map 
(these positions lay on the vertexes of a regular grid) and the assumption that the two dimensions of 
the map encode the two gaze angles. Depending on the eye position, the neurons are activated on 
this bases through a Gaussian function on the basis of the distance between their preferred angles 
and the actual gaze angles: 
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where ai is the activation of neuron i of the map, ||vg-vi|| is the distance between the gaze angles and 
the neuron preferred angles seen as two vector points in the neural map 2D space (the measure unit 
of this space is the distance between two neighbouring neurons),  is the width of the Gaussian 
function ( was set to 0.6). This way of encoding information in the map is in line with the “gain 
fields approach” which assumes that brain uses neural maps, and combines their activation in a 
multiplicative fashion, to encode information such as eye or limb postures (Pouget, Dayan & 
Zemel, 2000; Pouget & Latham, 2002; Shadmehr & Wise, 2005). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Anterior intraparietal sulcus (AIP): detection of object 
shape 
In the monkey PC, areas such as the anterior intraparietal area in the intraparietal sulcus (AIP; 
Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000), and the 
caudal portion of the intra parietal cortex (cIPS; Sakata, Taira, Kusunoki, Murata, & Tanaka, 1997), 
encode information about features of objects which are important to guide manipulation, for 
example shape, orientation, 3D aspects, and tactile aspects of objects. AIP neurons also discharge 
during goal directed actions performed with the hand and mouth (e.g., grasping, holding, and 
manipulation). AIP receives important connections from PFC (Borra et al., 2008; Baumann, Fluet, 
& Scherberger, 2009) and so it possibly plays a high-level role in the hierarchy of action selection 
and performance. On the basis of this evidence, many authors claim that AIP plays a central role in 
encoding object affordances (Fagg & Arbib, 1998; Oztop, Bradley, & Arbib, 2004). The human 
homologue of monkey AIP might equally be the anterior intraparietal area which is activated by the 
manipulation of objects and the view of graspable objects (Culham & Kanwisher, 2005; Simon, 
Mangin, Cohen, Hihan, Dehaene, 2002). 
In the model, AIP encodes information about object shape (cf. Oliver & Thompson-Schill, 2003; 
Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski, & Thompson-Schill, 2005; ). In particular, the neurons forming this 
map are activated with the average activation of the topologically correspondent RGB edge-
encoding neurons of VC. Note that the representation of the “shape” of objects used here should be 
considered as a “proxy” of the various object properties encoded in the real AIP. Moreover, the 
PFC-PMC influence on action selection used in the model should be considered a proxy of the 
whole influence that PFC exerts on PMC and AIP. These abstractions were imposed by the need to 
focus on the few properties of objects necessary to investigate compatibility effects while avoiding 
a detailed representation of other object properties underlying the actual performance of grasping 
(on this, cf. Fagg & Arbib, 1998; Oztop & Arbib, 2002; Oztop, Bradley, & Arbib, 2004). 
A further assumption model about AIP relates to the fact that, due to the activation process 
described above, large objects would tend to activate a much larger number of neurons with respect 
to small objects. This goes against the empirical evidence showing that the opposite happens in real 
brains, namely that the prefrontal cortex, rostral cingulate cortex, parietal cortex, and premotor 
cortex (but not primary motor cortex) tend to have a larger activation with small objects than with 
large ones (Ehrsson et al., 2000). This is likely due to the fact that the interaction with small objects 
requires a more sophisticated and detailed control of fingers in order to perform accurate precision 
grips, and so requires the activation of neurons not required to perform gross power grips. Although 
the level of abstraction of the model did not allow representing these differences, we used a 
coefficient s to scale the activation of AIP neurons based on the size of objects (s was set to 1 for 
small objects and to 0.3 for large objects and was used to multiply the activity of all neurons of 
AIP). Although this does not reproduce the causes of the different activation of PC by large and 
small objects, it allows reproducing the resulting differential activation at a phenomenon level. This 
allows regulating the activation of AIP so as to avoid the undesired effects on RTs which would be 
caused by the unrealistic large activation of AIP by large objects (see the Appendix for an 
indication of the effects of the manipulation of s on RTs). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Parietal reach region (PRR): detection of object position 
In monkeys, the medial intraparietal area (MIP) plays a key role in reaching (Wise, Boussaoud, 
Johnson, Caminiti, 1997). Neurons from this area encode visual stimuli, somatosensory information 
on arm movement and positioning, and gaze direction. It has been proposed that the human 
homologue of the monkey MIP is the “parietal reach region” (PRR; Andersen, Essick, & Siegel, 
1985; Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002; Culham & Kanwisher, 2001) which is 
activated during reaching movements and is modulated by eye position (DeSouza et al., 2000). 
In the model, the neurons of the PRR are a simple copy of SSC. In this respect, the PRR map 
was added for future extensions of the model to represent the processes performed by this area to 
support reaching movements. Indeed, in real brains this region implements fundamental 
sensorimotor transformations underlying reaching, for example the remapping of the object position 
in space from the eye reference frame to the limb reference frame on the basis of eye position in the 
orbit and the head orientation (Colby, 1998; Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Shadmehr & Wise, 2005; 
Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995). At the stage of development of the model in which 
the eye and head of the system do not move these complex remappings have not been simulated. 
However, they might be necessary in the future development of the model. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Premotor cortex, lateral division (PMCl): encoding of 
desired finger postures 
In monkeys, the PMC area F5 has been extensively studied as it seems to encode a rich repertoire of 
actions such as precision, power, and side grasps not only when these are performed but also when 
they are observed (Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998; Luppino & Rizzolatti, 2000; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). The human homologue of the monkey F5 has been linked to area 44 in the lateral 
premotor cortex, here referred to as PMCl for simplicity (Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998). 
In the model, the neurons of PMCl control hand movements in terms of the two desired angles 
issued to the finger joints. These angles, encoded by the two dimensions of the map, are “read out” 
from the map as a weighted average of the position of neurons within it, suitably remapped onto the 
angles space, with the weights of the average corresponding to the activation of the neurons. Note 
that the operation of  “information reading out” from a neural map is the opposite of the operation 
of “information encoding” onto a neural map seen in this section in relation to SSC. The two 
operations are used when information is encoded in neural maps with “population codes” (Pouget, 
Dayan, & Zemel, 2000). 
PMCl supports the selection of postures on the basis of a dynamic competition involving the 
leaky neurons which form it. These neurons have short-range lateral excitatory connections and 
long-range lateral inhibitory connections (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). When input signals from 
AIP and PFC activate neurons of PMCl, these tend to accumulate activation, form clusters (due to 
the lateral excitatory connections) and, at the same time, suppress the formation of other clusters 
(via lateral inhibitory connections). This dynamic process continues until a cluster succeeds in 
suppressing all other clusters, overcomes a threshold and triggers the hand movement based on the 
reading out of the map. Mathematically, each PMCl leaky neuron is activated as follows (the 
formula is presented for two generic PMC and PC areas as it is used for the interactions between all 
PC and PMC specific areas): 
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 where sj[t], uj[t] and aj[t] are respectively the input signal, the activation potential, and the activation 
of neuron j at time t, t is the integration time step (t was set to 0.01 sec, which implies that 100 
steps of simulation correspond to 1 sec of real time), τ is a time constant (τ was set to 0.5 sec), 
tanh[.] is the hyperbolic tangent function, and [.]+ is the identity function returning 0 for negative 
values. The Inner component of the input signal accounts for signals received from PMC lateral 
connections having hardwired connection weights w(PMC→PMC). These weights, excitatory for 
connections between neighbouring neurons and inhibitory for connections between distant neurons, 
are set to fixed values on the basis of a Gaussian function and an inhibition term as follows: 
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where w(PMC→PMC)ji is the weight between two neurons i and j of the map, ||vj-vi|| is the Euclidean 
distance between the two neurons in the map “neural space” (the measure unit being the distance 
between two neighbouring neurons),  is the width of the Gaussian function ( was set to 0.6), and 
I is the inhibition term (I was set to 0.9). The Dorsal stream component of the input signal accounts 
for the signals received from PC neurons through connections having weights w(PC→PMC). Finally, 
the component Ventral stream accounts for the signals received from PFC neurons through 
connections having weights w(PFC→PMC). Note that the weights w(PFC→PMC) were kept within the 
interval [0, 0.3] and the weights w(PC→PMC) within the interval [0, 0.1] as PFC signals need to 
overwhelm affordance-related signals when necessary (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Within the model, 
reaction times correspond to the time requested by at least one neuron from the winner cluster of 
PMC to reach an action-triggering threshold (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; the threshold value was 
set to 0.7). 
An important caveat on the RTs produced by the model is that they rely upon various 
coefficients which could not be set to realistic values drawn from the properties of real neurons. 
This was due to the relatively high abstraction level of the neurons of the model (firing rate 
neurons; cf. Dayan & Abbott, 2001). For this reason, the model was intended to reproduce only the 
pattern of qualitative results of the target experiments, and not their quantitative levels (e.g., in 
relation to the specific RTs exhibited by the real participants; cf. Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002). The 
Appendix presents a qualitative analysis on the effects that some key parameters of the model 
produce on its RTs. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Premotor cortex, dorsal division (PMCd): encoding of 
desired arm postures 
In monkeys, the dorsal premotor cortex (PMCd) plays an important role in the performance of 
reaching and pointing movements (Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997; Cisek & Kalaska, 
2005; Shadmehr & Wise, 2005). The human homologue of the monkey PMCd might be the dorsal 
6a area in the dorsal premotor cortex, here referred to as PMCd for simplicity (Rizzolatti, 
Luppino, & Matelli, 1998; Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti 1997). 
The neurons of PMCd encode the output of the system related to the control of the arm in terms 
of desired angles of the arm joints. Similarly to what is done for PMCl, these angles are mapped 
onto the two dimensions of the map and are “read out” from the map as a weighted average of the 
position of neurons in it (suitably remapped onto the joint space) with the weights of the average 
corresponding to the activation of the neurons. PMCd supports the selection of arm postures on the 
basis of a dynamic competition similar to the one implemented by PMCl (described above) and 
based on short-range lateral excitatory connections and long-range lateral inhibitory connections 
(see Equation 5; here t was set to 0.01 sec, τ was set to 0.3 sec,  was set to 0.6, and I was set to 
0.9). The reading out from the map, and the consequent action execution, are performed when a 
cluster of the map succeeds to suppress all other clusters and to overcome a certain threshold (set to 
0.7). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Ventral occipito-temporal cortex (VOT): encoding of 
object identity 
In the monkey brain, the inferior temporal cortex (ITC; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995) is 
located at the highest level of the ventral visual pathway and plays an essential role in visual object 
recognition (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Van Essen et al., 2001). In humans, various areas within 
the ventral visual pathway have an activation which responds to highly abstract patterns (e.g., faces, 
places, houses) and is rather invariant with respect to various aspects of images such as location, 
orientation, and luminance (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Vinberg & Grill-Spector, 2008). Among 
these areas, the ventral occipito-temporal cortex (VOT) seems to play a key role in object 
recognition. 
In the model, the VOT encodes the “identity of objects” on the basis of their colour and shape. 
Note that here “identity of objects” should be intended as “category of objects”: the former 
expression was used instead of the latter as the simulated setup involves only one non-noisy item 
for each object category. In accordance with visual physiology findings (Tanaka, 1996), from lower 
levels (VC) to higher levels of the visual hierarchy (e.g., VOT) the size of receptive fields and 
stimulus selectivity of neurons increase, whereas their visual topography is progressively lost. In the 
model, this was in part captured by recoding the information of VC into VOT on the basis of a self-
organising map (“SOM”; Kohonen, 1997). Each unit of the map is activated as follows: 
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where aj is the activation of VOT neuron j, aVC is the vector of activations of VC neurons, 
w(VC→VOT)j is the vector of the connection weights linking VC neurons to VOT neuron j,  is the size 
of the Gaussian function used to compute the activation ( was set to 0.55). SOMs tend to form 
weights such that for any given input pattern the activation function causes a hill-shaped spatially-
segregated cluster of active neurons within the map, whereas the other neurons remain silent. 
Moreover, similar input patterns tend to generate similar clusters of active neurons whereas 
substantially different input patterns tend to activate non-overlapping clusters.  
This modality of functioning of SOMs allow using them as a proxy of the representation of 
objects in high-level visual cortex which has a level of abstraction suitable for the purposes of this 
work. Indeed, SOMs were chosen as: (a) they tend to form categories of stimuli based on 
population-codes, similarly to what might happen in the brain (Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2000); (b) 
although they are sensitive to the spatial location of patterns within the image, they tend to respond 
to similar stimuli with the activation of similar clusters of units, while ignoring differences of few 
features (Kohonen, 1997): research on object categorisation carried out in the last ten years is 
showing that higher stages of visual processing tend to develop different areas dedicated to different 
broad classes of objects (e.g., faces, places, words, and houses; cf. Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004); 
(c) they are a computational device which is capable of developing categories of objects 
autonomously, so they are suitable to mimic processes of categorisation learning; (d) they perform a 
useful orthogonalisation of input patterns which aids downstream learning processes (e.g. based on 
Hebb learning rules); (e) they are computationally robust (i.e., tolerate noise) and at the same time 
parsimonious, and this eases modelling. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Superior temporal cortex for nouns (STCn): encoding of 
object names 
In humans, the superior temporal cortex (STC) is the locus of the primary auditory cortex (A1), of 
the auditory belt region of Wernicke’s area (WP), and of the auditory parabelt region of Wernicke’s 
area (WPB) (Pulvermüller, 2005). These regions play a key role in language comprehension as they 
send various efferent connections to prefrontal and premotor regions where some aspects of the 
sensorimotor representations of word referents might be encoded (Romanski et al., 1999; Young, 
Scannel, Burns, Blakemore, 1994; Hilgetag, Burns, O'Neill, Scannell, & Young, 2000). In this 
respect, it is important to consider that in the model the STC components are also connected to 
regions of PC. It is reasonable to assume that words can also recall aspects of their referents which 
are encoded in such regions (e.g., spatial and haptic aspects of stimuli). The authors are not aware 
of direct anatomical connections which might support these processes but there might be indirect 
neural pathways to support them. 
In the model, STC encodes both linguistic information about names of the seen objects and 
linguistic information about the instructions of the experiment. To differentiate these two kinds of 
information two neural maps were used which were assumed to represent two distinct sets of 
neuron clusters of STC: STCn, corresponding to neuron clusters encoding the (phonological aspects 
of the) names of objects, and STCi, corresponding to neuron clusters encoding the (phonological 
aspects of the) experiment instructions or, alternatively, the ecological conditions. Note that the 
distinction between STCn and STCi is a functional one, not an anatomical one, and is due to the 
lack of empirical data on where and how the nouns of objects and the experiment instructions are 
encoded within STC. STCn and STCi respectively project to the VOT and PFC to represent the fact 
that functionally the broad context experienced by the participants (experiment/ecological 
condition) likely exerts a relatively strong influence on the goals of actions encoded in PFC, and the 
fact that object nouns have relatively strong links with their sensorimotor counterparts. 
The neurons of STCn are activated with a different pattern for each different object (each pattern 
is formed by 20 randomly chosen neurons set equal to one and the rest set equal to zero). During the 
simulated tests, STCn neurons are activated gradually. This gradual activation represents, at a 
phenomenon level, the slow processing of the complex linguistic processes which in the real 
experiments likely activate the phonetic representations of words on the basis of read words. This 
gradual activation was introduced to avoid having biased RTs due to the lack of a specific 
simulation of the aforementioned linguistic processes which would have required overly complex 
mechanisms non needed for the scope of this research. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Superior temporal cortex for instructions (STCi): 
encoding of the experiment instructions or of the ecological conditions 
In the model, the neurons of STCi were activated with either one of two random patterns (each 
pattern was formed by 20 randomly chosen neurons set equal to one and the rest set equal to zero). 
These two patterns were assumed to correspond to either the instructions of the three target 
experiments which asked participants to perform a “categorisation grasp”/“decision reach”, or to an 
ecological context requiring the participants to perform a grasp or a reach suitable for the object 
type. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Prefrontal cortex (PFC): encoding of current goal 
In the model the neurons of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are assumed to encode information about 
the current goal of action depending on both the task (STCi) and the identity of the object (VOT), 
similarly to what is done in Deco and Rolls (2003). Computationally, PFC neurons are activated 
again according to a Kohonen activation function as the one used for the VOT (Equation 6). The 
use of Kohonen networks to also represent processes taking place in PFC is justified by the studies 
which show that this cortical area is involved in highest-levels of visual processing, categorization, 
and organisation of behaviour (Miller, Freedman, & Wallis, 2002; Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, 
& Miller, 2003; Shima, Isoda, Mushiake, & Tanji, 2007). 
These assumptions lead the system to form representations for all possible combinations of the 
eight objects used in each experiment and their two sub-tasks (ecological versus experimental 
conditions). A more parsimonious representation would have been possible, for example by 
allowing PFC to represent the two categories of objects required by the target experiments (e.g., 
natural vs. normal in the experiments with images and words) or the ecological experiment (e.g., 
large vs. small). However, this solution would have required introducing specific mechanisms, such 
as a supervised training mechanism, to allow the system to form the two categories before tackling 
the experimental task. The former solution was preferred as it was simpler (this usually eases the 
interpretation of results) and it was neutral with respect to the study of compatibility phenomena.  
Title level 2: TRoPICALS: Learning mechanisms 
The model was trained in three learning stages which roughly correspond to the main relevant 
learning phases experienced during life and during the experiment by real participants. These 
learning stages are now explained in detail and, when necessary, they are explained separately for 
the three experiments with images, words and object parts. Before training, the weights of all the 
plastic connections of the model were set to values randomly drawn within a uniform distribution 
within [0, 0.1].  
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Phase 1. Learning to interact with objects during life: 
experiment with images and experiment with words 
Before the experiments with images and words, the system underwent a first learning phase which 
simulated learning to grasp objects experienced by real participants during life. This learning phase 
led the model to acquire the affordance-based behaviour within the dorsal stream (in particular, this 
process updated AIP-PMCl connection weights; cf. Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998) and to 
form the identity of objects within the ventral stream (in particular, this process updated the VC-
VOT connections; cf. Rodman, 1994). 
The training was performed by repeatedly presenting each of the eight objects to the model (the 
simulation steps related to the presentation of one object is here referred to as “trial”). On the 
perceptual side, at each presentation VC performed colour-based edge detection of the object image 
and PC performed colour-independent edge detection (i.e., extracted the shape of objects) by 
averaging the activation of RGB neurons having the same position in the three maps of VC. 
AIP-PMCl connection weights were updated on the basis of a “motor babbling” process and a 
Hebb covariance learning rule. This allowed the dorsal pathway to acquire the capacity to perform 
the correct grasp depending on the shape of objects. Motor babbling processes (von Hosten, 1982; 
Caligiore et al., 2008) are general learning processes for which the production of rather unstructured 
behaviours allow the formation of basic associations between sensory representations and motor 
representations (Piaget, 1952). Here the motor babbling process involved these phases at each step 
of the trial: (a) one object was set close to the hand palm of the system; (b) the neurons of PMCl 
were activated on the basis of a Gaussian function (the shape and parameters of the function were 
set as in Equation 3) encoding specific desired angles of the hand aperture: such angles were 
progressively decreased of two degrees per DOF at each step of the trial; (c) the desired hand 
postures encoded by PMCl were issued to the PD models (“muscles”) and these produced suitable 
torques which progressively closed the hand on the object during the trial; (d) in the step in which 
the thumb, index, and medium finger tips were in touch with the object (see Figure 4) the activation 
patterns of AIP and of PMCl were associated on the basis of the covariance Hebb rule (see Equation 
7 below). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The activation of PMCl with progressively smaller apertures is a simplification of the random 
activation of the map which would have been caused by a motor-babbling process producing the 
execution of random grip actions (the use of the regular activation of the map instead of a random 
process leads to similar effects and speeds up learning; cf. Caligiore et al., 2008). Triggering 
learning when the hand has a three-finger grip on the object can be considered a simple kind of 
reinforcement learning process (cf. Berthier, Rosenstein, & Barto, 2005; Bonaiuto & Arbib, in 
press; Ognibene, Rega, & Baldassarre, 2006). 
When learning was triggered, the all-to-all connection weights between AIP and PMCl neurons 
were updated on the basis of a Hebb covariance learning rule (Sejnowski, 1977; Dayan & Abbott, 
2001) to form associations between the perceived shape of the object (AIP) and the corresponding 
hand posture (PMCl). Formally, the Hebb rule was as follows: 
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where η is a learning rate (η was set to 4), wmax keeps the connection weights within a small range 
(wmax was set to 0.1), aj is the activation of PMCl neuron j, ai is the activation of AIP neuron i, ā 
refers to the moving decaying averages of the activation of neurons aj and ai, denoted respectively 
with āj or āi (ξ was set to 0.8; these averages were set at zero at the beginning of each trial). This 
rule strengthens the connections between each set of neurons which have both an activation above 
or both an activation below their own average activation, and weakens their connections in the other 
cases. Note that although simple, this process allowed the system to store various grips with 
different apertures depending on the different size of objects. 
During motor babbling, the ventral stream acquired the capacity to categorise objects on the 
basis of their appearance. In particular, VC-VOT connection weights formed the categories of 
objects on the basis of a Kohonen learning rule (Kohonen, 1997; Ritter, Martinetz, & Schulten, 
1992): 
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where µ is a learning rate (µ was set to 1), vj is the vector point corresponding to the position in the 
VOT of the VOT neuron j whose incoming weights are being updated, vj* is the vector point 
corresponding to the position in the map of the VOT neuron with maximum activation (“winning 
neuron”), σ is the width of the Gaussian activation function of VOT neurons (σ was set to 0.55), ai 
is the activation of the VC neuron i, wji is the connection weight between the VC neuron i and the 
VOT neuron j. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Phase 1. Learning to interact with objects during life: 
experiment with object parts 
Before the experiments with object parts, the model underwent a learning phase which simulated 
learning to reach objects experienced by real participants during life. This learning phase involved 
acquiring the reaching capability within the dorsal stream (in particular, this process updated PRR-
PMCd connections) and forming the identity of objects within the ventral stream. As in the 
experiment with images, the eight objects of the experiment were repeatedly presented to the 
system (trials). During these presentations, SSC encoded the eye gaze direction and the PRR the 
object position. At the same time, the ventral stream acquired the capacity to categorise objects on 
the basis of their appearance by updating VC-VOT connection weights (Equation 8) as done for the 
experiments with image and words. 
PRR-PMCd connection weights were updated on the basis of a second “motor babbling” process 
and the same Hebb covariance learning rule used in the experiments with images and words 
(Equation 7; in this case wmax was set to 0.4 and η was set to 38). This allowed the dorsal pathway 
to acquire the capacity to perform the correct reaching actions depending on the positions of objects 
in space. The motor babbling process involved these phases (here one trial lasted few steps): (a) the 
hand was located in one position randomly chosen from three different positions on the working 
plane representing the locations in space of the buttons to be pressed during the experiment; (b) the 
eye focused the hand barycentre on the basis of the focussing reflex; (c) the neurons of PMCd were 
activated on the basis of a Gaussian function centred on the current arm posture (Equation 3 was 
used to this purpose); (d) after few steps required by the focussing reflex to stabilise the eye gaze, 
the object location (encoded in the PRR) and the arm posture (encoded in PMCd) were associated 
on the basis of the covariance Hebb rule (Equation 7). 
The activation of PMCd with the postures of the arm corresponding to certain positions in space 
is an abstraction of a random activation of PMCd by the motor babbling process which would cause 
the performance of random reaching actions (the activation of the map in correspondence to only 
the three spatial positions simplifies and speeds up learning, but the mechanism can allow the 
model to learn to reach any position in the working space; cf. Ognibene, Rega, & Baldassarre, 2006, 
and Caligiore, Parisi, & Baldassarre, 2007). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Phase 2. Learning to name objects: experiment with 
words and experiment with object parts 
In the experiment with words and the experiment with object parts the first learning phase 
(illustrated in the previous sections) was followed by a second phase which mimicked the 
acquisition in the early life of the association between the internal representations of object names 
and the internal representations of the perceived object features. In the experiment using objects 
names this learning phase allowed the model to develop STCn-AIP connection weights, that is the 
associations between object names and the representations of their shape. In the experiment with 
object parts it allowed the model to develop STCn-PRR connection weights, that is the associations 
between object names and the representations of their experienced position in space. In both 
experiments this learning phase also allowed the model to develop STCn-VOT connection weights, 
that is the associations between object names and object identities. 
During the learning phase the model interacted several times with objects (trials). In the 
experiment with words, the following processes took place at each trial (which in this case lasted 
only one step): (a) the model perceived an object and this activated VC;  (b) VC activated AIP;  (c) 
VC activated the VOT;  (d) the object noun activated STCn; (e) the Hebb covariance learning rule 
(Equation 7) was used to update the weights of STCn-AIP and STCn-VOT connections.  
In the experiment with object parts, these processes took place at each trial (lasting only one 
step): (a) the model perceived an object and this activated VC and SSC;  (b) SSC activated the 
PRR; (c) VC activated the VOT; (d) the object noun activated STCn; (e) the Hebb covariance 
learning rule (Equation 7) was used to update the weights of STCn-PRR and STCn-VOT 
connections. Note that in this experiment, when object parts were presented the VOT was activated 
not only on the basis of the image of the object part but also with the image of the relative whole 
object (“car” for the object parts “roof” and “wheels”; “doll” for the object parts “head” and “feet”). 
Indeed, during learning in real life the real subjects likely experienced the whole objects before their 
parts. This implied that, after learning, when parts of objects were named the model activated not 
only the representation of the knowledge related to them but also the representation of the 
knowledge on the whole corresponding object. This assumption is important as it allowed the model 
to solve the task, that is to indicate if object parts belong to the whole objects or not. 
During training, the maximum value wmax of STCn-AIP, STCn-PRR and STCn-VOT connection 
weights was set respectively to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 whereas their respective learning rates were set to 3, 
15, 16. The reason for these choices is that STCn-VOT connections need to be stronger than those 
of STCn-AIP and STCn-PRR to allow the ventral pathway to exert control on actions and, when 
necessary, to overwhelm the signals from the dorsal pathway. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Phase 3. Learning to accomplish the experimental tasks: 
experiment with images, experiment with words, and experiment with object parts 
The third learning phase mimicked the acquisition, within the ventral pathway, of knowledge 
necessary for accomplishing the psychological experiment. The learning processes of this phase 
were intended to abstract the formation of associations between stimuli and responses in prefrontal 
areas, happening during the initial phase of the experiment, on the basis of trial-and-error processes 
and instruction-guided learning. This training phase also allowed the system to develop a PFC 
control during the execution of the “ecological tasks” learned in phases 1 and 2 (note that in 
ecological conditions the prefrontal and dorsal control signals always match). In the model, this 
PFC control was not necessary to execute the ecological tasks, as the dorsal pathway was sufficient 
to correctly execute the actions suggested by the object affordances. However, this acquisition was 
simulated because it was useful to obtain the prediction of the model presented in a following 
section and because it is biologically plausible (as the ventral pathway, fundamental for the 
psychological experiment, is also present during the execution of the ecological task). 
The learning phase involved repeated interactions with the objects (trials) in either the 
experimental or the ecological condition. At each step of the trials the following processes took 
place: (a) the model perceived an object and this activated VC (and also SSC in the experiment with 
object parts) and hence AIP (or the PRR in the experiment with object parts) and the VOT; (b) 
STCi was activated with the specific pattern corresponding to either the psychological or the 
ecological condition; (c) the hand (or arm in the experiment with object parts) performed the grip 
(or the reaching action) requested by the ecological or the psychological tasks: in the psychological 
task the grip (or reach) was performed on the basis of the dorsal pathway responding to the 
affordances of objects; in the experimental task it was assumed that the correct grip (or reach), 
dependent on the experimental instructions and stimuli, was performed thanks to memories and 
processes related to such instructions (these were not explicitly simulated as not relevant for this 
research); (d) the connection weights between STCi and the VOT, considered as a whole input 
neural layer, and PFC, considered as an output neural layer, were updated using the Kohonen 
algorithm (Equation 8); (e) the weights of the PFC-PMCl connections (or PFC-PMCd connections 
in the experiment with object parts) were updated on the basis of the Hebb covariance learning rule 
(Equation 7; in the equation, wmax was set to 0.3 and 0.65 for respectively PFC-PMCl and PFC-
PMCd connections, and η was set to 5 for both). 
The training of (STCi VOT)-PFC connection weights allowed the system to acquire suitable 
representations of “goals” within PFC, that is the representations that are necessary to decide which 
action corresponds with which combination of psychological task and object identity. The training 
of the PFC-PMC connection weights allowed the system to associate the representation of the 
particular combination of task and object identity, encoded as a whole in PFC, to the suitable action 
encoded in PMC and required by the psychological or the ecological task. 
Title level 1: Results 
This section reports and discusses the results of the simulations directed to replicate and account for 
the three target experiments. The section also presents some predictions related to the experiment 
with images and the experiment with object parts. 
Title level 2: The experiment with images 
Title level 3: TRoPICALS reproduces and provides an interpretation of the results of the 
experiment with images of Tucker and Ellis (2004) 
To replicate the results obtained by Tucker and Ellis (2004) using images, the simulated participants 
underwent the first learning phase mimicking the acquisition of grasping skills happening “during 
life” (i.e., before the experimental test). To this purpose, each simulated participant learned to grasp 
objects for 16,000 cycles (each object presentation lasted 200 cycles). This learning process allowed 
the participant to become able to trigger, via the dorsal pathway, grasping actions based on the 
affordances evoked by the seen objects (i.e., a power grip for large objects and a precision grip for 
small objects). In parallel, in the ventral pathway the VOT formed eight different clusters of 
neurons representing the eight different objects of the task (Figure 4). After these learning 
processes, when the system sees an object VC activates and encodes its shape and colour, AIP 
activates and encodes the object shape (Figure 4), and finally PMCl gains activation until some of 
its neurons reach the action-triggering threshold and cause the execution of either a power or a 
precision grip suitable for the object size through the simulated “muscles” and hand (Figure 5). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
This first learning phase was followed by a further learning phase which completed the training 
of the ventral pathway and mimicked both learning to accomplish the experimental task on the basis 
of the instructions and learning to exert prefrontal control during the performance of the ecological 
task. This second learning procedure was based on the presentation of the eight objects for further 
16,000 cycles. During these presentations, STCi was activated with either one of the two patterns 
corresponding to the ecological grasping task or the categorisation experimental task. When STCi 
was activated with the ecological task pattern, all the participants performed grasping actions 
corresponding to the size of the objects. When STCi was activated with the experimental task 
pattern, half of the participants performed the categorisation actions corresponding to the “natural-
power grip” and “artefact-precision grip” associations and the other half performed the actions 
corresponding to the reversed associations. During these training phases, the eight objects caused 
the reactivation of the eight different VOT neuron clusters learned during life and PFC learned, with 
the Kohonen algorithm, to activate sixteen different neuron clusters corresponding to the 
combinations of the two ecological/experimental tasks with the eight objects (Figure 6). Note how 
this rich representation of objects and different contexts allows PFC to bias action selection in any 
possible way, for example in the way established by the arbitrary rule of the psychological 
experiment (e.g., power grip for artefacts and precision grip for natural objects or, vice-versa, power 
grip for natural objects and precision grip for artefacts). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
These learning processes allow the system to reproduce the main result of the experiments of 
Tucker and Ellis (2004). Figure 7 compares the RTs of the simulated 20 participants and the RTs 
exhibited by the real participants in the target experiment. While these data were collected the 
learning processes were blocked. A two-way ANOVA on RTs was performed with the factors 
“congruency” (congruent vs. incongruent) and “object size” (large vs. small). In agreement with the 
experiments run with real participants, RTs were faster in congruent than in incongruent trials (F(1, 
16)=3.16, p = 0.080) whereas there was not a significant difference between small and large objects 
(F(1, 16)=0.00, p = 0.997). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The model provides a detailed account of this result. During the experimental test, STCi is 
activated with the pattern corresponding to the categorisation task. In incongruent trials, the ventral 
pathway (VC-(STCi and VOT )-PFC) evokes an action which is different from the one evoked by 
the dorsal pathway (e.g., a power grip to categorise a raisin as natural) via a suitable bias issued by 
PFC to PMCl, thus causing a conflict within the latter (Figure 8a). As the PFC-PMCl signal is 
stronger than the AIP-PMCl signal, the bias from PFC wins the competition (e.g., by triggering a 
power grip) but the RTs are relatively long. In fact, when the PFC- and the AIP-induced clusters 
mismatch they lead to a slower charge of PMCl leaky neurons which will win the competition, so 
these neurons take longer to reach the threshold required to trigger the corresponding action. On the 
contrary, in congruent trials (Figure 8b) the signals from PFC and AIP match and so converge on 
the same action representations within PMCl and so cause relatively fast RTs. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Title level 3: Predictions of the model: effects of prolonged training on reaction times 
The model produced some predictions which might be tested in experiments with human 
participants. The first prediction concerns the effects of a very long training, based on the 
experiment with objects, on the performance of participants. In this respect, it is important to notice 
that in the model “learning during life” mimics the slow learning processes underlying the 
formation of habits (Salmon & Butters, 1995), whereas “learning during the experiment” mimics 
the fast learning/problem solving processes taking place in prefrontal areas (Pasupathy & Miller, 
2005; Seger & Cincotta, 2006). The simulation leading to the prediction mimics a condition where 
the task of the psychological experiment is performed so many times (“overtraining”) that the 
knowledge acquired by the ventral pathway has time to be also acquired by the dorsal pathway. The 
prediction is that this overtraining causes the following effects: (a) the size of the hand aperture 
when grasping objects in ecological conditions will increase for small objects and decrease for large 
ones; (b) compatibility effects will diminish, in particular the differences of RTs in congruent 
versus incongruent conditions will decrease. 
The prediction was obtained using the following procedure. First, six simulated participants went 
though the learning phases illustrated in the above sections (in particular, training of the dorsal 
pathway based on object affordances and training of the ventral pathway based on the experimental 
and ecological conditions). Then, they performed the experimental test for 16,000 cycles while the 
learning process involving the dorsal pathway was reactivated (recall that this learning was blocked 
to collect the data reported in Figure 7). In each trial, when an object image was presented and the 
neural competition taking place in PMCl reached the action-triggering threshold, AIP-PMCl 
connection weights were trained on the basis of the Hebb covariance learning rule (Equation 7). 
This training led the winning action encoded in PMCl, which was coherent with the PFC bias and 
hence with the experimental task, to associate with the object representation in AIP. In congruent 
cases this training further strengthened the dorsal tendency to select grasping actions coherent with 
the size of objects, whereas in incongruent cases it caused the dorsal pathway to slowly learn, to 
some extent, to perform actions coherent with the experimental task (for example to use a precision 
grip with a potato if the task required such grip to classify the object as natural). 
Figure 9 reports the index and thumb angles produced by the model in an ecological experiment 
before and after the overtraining, averaged for the incompatible cases and averaged for the six 
simulated participants. The graph shows that after training the hand aperture for large objects 
decreases whereas for small objects it increases. Two one-way ANOVAs with participants as 
random factors were performed, one on large and one on small objects, in which the independent 
factor was the training (before vs. after training) and the dependent variable was the distance 
between the thumb and the other fingers.  Both ANOVAs were significant: for the large objects the 
fingers distance was reduced after training (F(1, 5) = 256.26, p <0.0001) whereas for the small 
objects the finger distance increased after training (F(1, 5)=101.74, p <0.0001). This result shows 
that the dorsal pathway acquires the tendency to perform actions in agreement with the 
experimental task instead of the size of objects. Interestingly, the system continues to correctly 
perform the ecological task thanks to the PFC bias which remains capable of distinguishing the 
experimental and ecological conditions on the basis of the input from STCi. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
We also measured the RTs before and after the training with the same modalities illustrated in 
the above sections and used to reproduce the compatibility effects (so including both compatible 
and incompatible cases). The results of this measurement, reported in Figure 10, show that the 
overtraining leads to an attenuation of the compatibility effects as the interference with the 
execution of the experimental task caused by the dorsal pathway progressively fades away. In the 
ANOVA performed with the within-participant factors of “grip” (precision vs. power), “object” 
(small vs. large) and Training (before vs. after) the 3 way interaction was significant (F (1,5)=6.91, 
p <0.05). Post-hoc Newman Keuls tests showed that with both small objects and with large objects 
the difference between compatible and non compatible grip was statistically significant before 
training (respectively, p = 0.004; p = 0.039), whereas it was not significant after training. If 
confirmed by tests run with real participants, these results would further support the hypothesis that 
the causes of compatibility effects reside in the automatic response tendencies of the dorsal 
pathway. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
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 Title level 3: Discussion 
The four principles incorporated by TRoPICALS are at the core of the interpretation of the target 
experiments furnished by the model. In this respect, the differences in the RTs obtained in 
congruent and incongruent conditions can be explained in terms of the cooperation/competition of 
the biases exerted on action selection by the ventral and dorsal pathways (first principle). In 
congruent conditions the two pathways tend to select the same action and so the bias from PFC 
incorporating the goals of the participants, here related to the experimental task (second principle), 
sums up with the motor signal produced by the affordance, automatically elicited by the object via 
the PC. This causes PMC to rapidly accumulate evidence in favour of one same action and to 
produce fast RTs (third principle). On the contrary, in incongruent conditions the signals of the two 
pathways mismatch and as a result the ventral pathway has to suppress the tendency of the dorsal 
pathway to automatically elicit actions that are congruent with the affordances of objects but are not 
in line with the participants’ goals. This leads PMC to inhibit the desired response and decide on the 
correct action. This process brings about a delay and therefore produces longer RTs (third 
principle). 
The account presented here supports the theoretical positions for which in particular conditions 
motor information and affordances tend to be automatically activated independently of the goals of 
participants (cf. Borghi et al., 2007; Castiello, 1999; Creem & Proffitt, 2001; de’ Sperati & Stucchi, 
1997). As assumed in the model, the dorsal system is a good candidate for encoding visuomotor 
representations based on physical characteristics of objects, and for biasing the activation of low-
level relevant object-action associations, based on past history of the individuals’ interactions with 
objects (Tucker & Ellis, 2001). In particular, when goals are unspecified, or only loosely specified 
(as it happens in ecological conditions) such low-level visuomotor transformations receive a high 
priority and guide behaviour. When present, more complex semantic knowledge about the objects, 
suitably integrated with external directions or rules (as it happens in the model during the 
psychological test), can override the biases automatically generated by affordances (Goodale & 
Humphrey, 1998; Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001). 
This “action-based account” of compatibility effects contrasts with (or, at a more abstract level, 
refines) other “disembodied” accounts, for example those based on putative “abstract codes”. These 
constructs have been again used, for example, to explain the Simon effect (Lu & Proctor, 1995). 
The idea is that target stimuli automatically activate abstract “location codes” and these codes tend 
to influence responses if they have spatial components, thus resulting in a facilitation or an 
interference effect (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). This account faces the difficulty of 
explaining why abstract codes related to objects automatically activate spatial components of 
responses (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Action-based accounts such as the one presented here overcome 
this difficulty thanks to the core assumption on the continuity existing between spatial aspects of 
sensory representations and spatial aspects of motor representations within visuomotor 
transformations. Indeed, such action-based accounts propose that semantic representations 
inherently include motor components (Borghi et al., 2004; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 
2008). 
However, the explanation of compatibility effects presented here bears much in common with 
the “dual-route models” which are used to explain compatibility effects related to the Simon effect 
(e.g., see the same Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990, which, as aformentioned also proposed 
the idea of location codes; see also De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Toth et al., 1995; Kornblum, 
Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999; cf. also the last sections on this). Although differing in details, 
dual-code models agree that different aspects of stimuli activate two different processing pathways, 
one which is slow and is based on working memory and one which is fast and is based on long-term 
memory. The congruency effect derives from the fact that the fast automatic activation primes the 
code for the correct response in congruent trials whereas it hinders it in incongruent trials. The 
model presented here is an advancement with respect to dual-code models in several aspects: (a) it 
is formulated in an “fully expanded” and operational form (i.e., in terms of an explicit 
computational model) whereas the dual-code models have been formulated only verbally: this 
allows for reproduction of the detailed mechanisms behind the generation of different RTs and for 
the formulation of specific predictions; (b) it is based on specific neuroscientific hypotheses on the 
brain architecture and mechanisms behind the “dual route” hypothesis; (c) it is tested in an 
embodied setup; (d) it reproduces the learning processes leading to the acquisition of the target 
behaviours (Kornblum, Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999, propose a connectionist model but with 
hand coded connection weights: although very interesting, the model cannot reproduce/predict 
effects such as those reported below in the section related to the prediction of the effects of 
overtraining with the task of the experiment of Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004); (e) it 
represents a theoretical framework with the potential of integrating the explanations of different 
compatibility effects (see last sections on this). 
The model also leads to the formulation of some predictions on the possible effects caused by 
overtraining in the psychological experiment task. The model shows that overtraining might lead 
the participants to exhibit less pronounced compatibility effects. Namely, the dorsal pathway would 
learn the experimental task and so would exert a lower interference on the decisions performed by 
the ventral pathway. Kinematics measures on the hand aperture of the model indicated that with 
overtraining the dorsal pathway actually converges towards the grips requested by the experimental 
task, and RT measures indicated that the compatibility effect diminishes after a long training 
session. If confirmed by similar tests on real participants, this prediction would corroborate the 
hypothesis put forward by the model for which the automatic reactivation of knowledge within the 
dorsal pathway facilitates/interferes with the execution of the experimental task and this is the major 
cause of the compatibility effects illustrated in Tucker and Ellis (2004). Note that the prediction 
shares a resemblance with recent findings on the effects of repetition of actions on processing 
abstract and concrete words (Glenberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 2008).  
An important caveat about the prediction, however, is that in real brains the existence of 
connections between the ventral and the dorsal pathway (Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider, 
1994), or any possible sensory input reaching the dorsal pathway and informing it on the 
experimental/ecological context, might lead the dorsal pathway to acquire the capacity to properly 
respond to both experimental and ecological tasks. As currently the model does not have any of 
these connections, when the dorsal pathway acquires the capability of performing the experimental 
tasks it also looses the capability of performing the ecological one. This aspect of the model might 
be improved in the future, for example by establishing a communication between the ventral and 
dorsal pathways before they converge within PMC or by letting the dorsal pathway to access 
context information through other pathways. Note, however, that this simplification of the model 
does not affect the relevance of the prediction according to which a prolonged learning of the dorsal 
pathway during the experimental task would cause a reduction in compatibility effects. 
Title level 2: The experiment with words 
Title level 3: TRoPICALS reproduces and provides an interpretation of the results of the 
experiment with words of Tucker and Ellis (2004) 
In order to replicate the results obtained by Tucker and Ellis (2004) with object names, the 
simulated participants underwent three learning phases: (a) the learning phase simulating “life” and 
directed to acquire the affordances within the dorsal pathway and object identities within the VOT; 
(b) the learning phase mimicking the acquisition of simple linguistic associations during life; (c) the 
learning phase involving the formation of suitable goals within PFC, and suitable top-down biases 
on actions within PFC-PMCl connections. The first and third of these learning phases were identical 
to those illustrated in relation to the experiment with object images so only the second learning 
phase will be explained in further detail. This learning phase lasted 4,000 cycles (200 cycles per 
object) and led the system to form associations between the names of objects represented in STCn 
and their shape and identity representations activated by VC respectively in AIP and the VOT. 
These associations were formed on the basis of the Hebb covariance learning rule (Equation 7).  
These three learning phases allowed for the reproduction of the Tucker and Ellis (2004) 
experiment run with word stimuli. In order to mimic the presentation of the names of objects 
without their sight, STCn was activated with words patterns whereas VC was not activated (recall 
that the word patterns were activated progressively from zero and one to simulate the time 
requested by the processing of words: the effect of this is shown in Figure 11a). Figure 12 shows 
the results reported by Tucker and Ellis (2004) and the results of the same tests run with the 
simulated participants. For comparison, the two diagrams of the figure report not only the results of 
the experiment with words, but also those of the experiment with images. The figure shows that the 
model reproduces the main congruency effect even if the visual stimuli (the seen objects) are 
substituted with linguistic stimuli (the names of objects). 
A two-way ANOVA on RTs was performed with two factors, “congruency” (congruent vs. 
incongruent) and “object size” (large vs. small). The congruency factor resulted to be statistically 
significant: the RTs were faster in congruent than in incongruent trials (F(1, 16) = 8.84, p = 0.004), 
whereas there was no significant difference between small and large objects (F(1, 16)=1.35, p = 
0.249). This result is due to the fact that the linguistic input causes patterns of activation in the VOT 
and AIP similar to those caused by visual inputs (“internal simulations”). This can be seen by 
comparing Figure 11, which reports the internal activations caused by words, and Figure 4, which 
reports the internal activations caused by the objects corresponding to those words. Due to this 
similarity, such “internal simulations” cause activations which diffuse along the dorsal and ventral 
pathways and cause congruency phenomena similar to those caused by the referents of words. 
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Title level 3: Discussion 
The mechanisms used to simulate simple associative linguistic processes allowed TRoPICALS to 
give an explanation of compatibility effects obtained with object names by Tucker and Ellis (2004). 
The key idea underlying these results is that linguistic representations of words are grounded in the 
sensorimotor system. Thus they can activate the internal representations of the referents of words 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). As a consequence, the activation of these representations by words 
triggers action selection processes affected by the same congruency phenomena caused by the direct 
experience of objects (or their images). 
These results contribute to understand the detailed mechanisms which might underlie theories 
that propose action-based views of language (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; Arbib, 2005; Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Simmons, Hamann, 
Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008). According to these theories, linguistic representations (e.g., 
related to the phonological or articulatory aspects of language) are tightly coupled with other non-
linguistic sensorimotor representations, and so can give rise to a number of relevant phenomena on 
the basis of simple associations. Although the whole complex spectrum of language phenomena 
cannot be accounted for in these terms, these associations seem to be at the right level of abstraction 
to give an economical account of compatibility effects. 
Title level 2: The experiment with object parts 
Title level 3: TRoPICALS reproduces and provides an interpretation of the results of the 
experiment of Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) with object parts 
To replicate the results obtained by Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) with object parts, ten 
simulated participants underwent all the three learning phases as described in relation to the 
experiment with words. These learning phases involved: (a) the acquisition of affordances within 
the dorsal pathway (SSC-PRR-PMCd; 6,000 cycles), and object representations in VC-VOT 
connection weights (20,000 cycles); (b) the acquisition of simple linguistic associations (4,000 
cycles) in STCn-VOT and STCn-PRR connection weights; (c) the formation of suitable goals in 
(STCi VOT)-PFC connection weights, and suitable actions within PFC-PMCd connection weights 
(6,000 cycles). 
One main difference with the experiment with words was due to the involvement of the SSC-
PRR-PMCd neural pathway instead of the VC-AIP-PMCl pathway. Figure 13 shows the activations 
of VC and the PRR caused by the objects and the activations of the VOT after learning. Another 
important difference relates to the training of the ventral pathway in the second learning phase 
involving STCn-PRR and STCn-VOT connections. These were trained in the same way as in the 
experiment with words with the important difference that when the object parts were presented they 
were associated, within VOT, with both the representation of the identity of the object parts and 
with the representation of the identity of the whole object they belonged to (i.e., “roof” and 
“wheels” were associated with their own representations and with the “car” representation; “head” 
and “feet” were associated with their own representations and with the “doll” representation). 
Figure 11b shows an example of activation of the PRR and the VOT caused in time by the name 
“doll” after this training (recall that name patterns activated progressively). The effect of the 
particular training of the VOT can be seen in Figure 14, clearly showing how names of object parts 
activate not only their own representations but also the representations of the whole objects they 
belong to (cf. the activations of the VOT shown in this figure with those shown in figure 13 and 
elicited by object images). Figure 14 also shows how the third training phase led PFC to develop 
different representations which depended not only on objects but also on the condition faced by the 
system (experiment vs. ecology). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 13 about here 
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Insert Figure 14 about here 
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The three training phases allowed the system to acquire the capabilities of reproducing the target 
experiment with object parts of Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004). To see this, STCn was 
activated with words patterns corresponding to the names of the object parts (roof, wheels, head and 
feet) and the RTs were recorded. Figure 15 shows the results of the tests carried out with real 
participants and the results of the same tests carried out with the simulated participants. The figure 
shows that the model reproduces the target congruency effect. A two-way ANOVA on RTs with 
participants as random factors and “part location” (upper vs. lower part) and “response location” 
(yes-is-up or yes-is-down) as factors was performed. As in the target experiment, the interaction 
was significant (F (1, 4) = 20.77, p < 0.02). Newman-Keuls post-hoc showed that with upward 
movements upper parts (M = 900) produced significantly faster RTs than lower parts (M = 1102; p 
= 0.05), whereas the opposite was true with downward movements (M = 1042 vs. M = 924). In the 
last case the difference only approaches significance (p = 0.07), but this is probably due to the low 
number of the involved participants. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 15 about here 
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The obtained result can be explained as follows. In the ventral pathway, the names of object 
parts cause a reaching motion directed to the buttons as requested by the experimental task. At the 
same time, in the dorsal pathway the stimuli tend to cause a reaching action directed to the spatial 
location that those parts had during the ecological training. In incongruent trials, the ventral 
pathway (STCn-(STCi and VOT)-PFC-PMCd) evokes a different action with respect to the dorsal 
pathway (STCn-PRR-PMCd), for example a “yes-up” answer to say that wheels are part of the car. 
This causes a conflicting signal arriving to PMCd. As the PFC-PMCd signal is stronger than the 
PRR-PMCd signal, the bias from PFC wins the competition but the RTs are relatively long. On the 
contrary, in congruent trials the two signals are congruent and so cause relatively fast RTs. 
Title level 3: Predictions of the model: compatibility effects caused by the embodied 
representations of words 
Thr version of the model used to reproduce the experiment with object parts produced specific 
predictions which might be tested in experiments with real participants. These predictions refer to 
the possible effects that the perception of a first word, referring to an object having a particular 
spatial location (for example the upper part of an object), might have on the RTs of the action 
needed to indicate the spatial location of an object indicated by a second word. For example, the 
name “roof” indicated as a first word should speed up the “up response” used to indicate that the 
object indicated by a second word, for example “head”, is located “up”, even if the two words refer 
to different objects. On the contrary, it should slow down the “down response” used to indicate that 
the object related to a second word, for example “feet”, is located “down”. This happens because 
the first word automatically activates internal simulations involving a particular spatial portion of 
the referent object (e.g., the upper part). This increases or decreases the RTs needed to trigger 
actions having a spatial component respectively compatible or incompatible with the one which was 
initially simulated. 
In detail, the predictions of the model were obtained as follows. First, six simulated participants 
went though the three learning phases illustrated in the previous section. After these trainings, the 
model perceived a first word indicating an object part for 0.8 sec (this short time prevented the 
system from triggering a reaching action related to the first word). This presentation was followed 
by the presentation of a second word indicating another object part. In particular, we used couples 
of words where the first word referred to the object parts related to the “doll” (“head” and “feet”) 
and the second word referred to the object-parts related to the “car” (“roof” and “wheels”). In this 
way the two object parts were not related to the same object: this is intended to represent a more 
general experimental condition for which the only semantic relationship existing between the two 
object parts presented in sequence is in terms of their spatial locations. The task asked the 
participants to indicate the spatial location of the object related to the second word by performing a 
reaching movement directed either to the “up button” or to the “down button” 
Figure 16 shows the RTs of the model for triggering the requested actions in the cases in which 
the second names of objects were preceded by names of objects with compatible or incompatible 
spatial locations. The ANOVA performed on RTs showed a compatibility effect (F(1, 4) = 7.28, p = 
0.054): the RTs of the reaching actions used to indicate the spatial location of the second-word 
object sped up or slowed down when preceded by words referring to objects with respectively 
compatible and incompatible spatial locations. The reason for this is that the presentation of the first 
word affects the selection of the response to the second word as follows: (a) the first word activates 
the spatial location of the indicated object within the PRR; (b) the PRR activates PMCd and this 
starts to accumulate activation in favour of a reaching movement directed to such spatial location; 
(c) if the spatial locations of the first and second words/objects are compatible, the presentation of 
the second word causes an activation of the PRR and PMCd similar to the one caused by the first 
word and this results in relatively fast RTs. On the other hand, if the spatial locations of the first and 
second words/objects are compatible they cause different activations in the PRR and PMCd and the 
second word has to suppress the previous activation in PMCd and this produces relatively slow 
RTs. 
This prediction has some similarities with the results of the experiment run by  Zwaan and 
Yaxley (2003). This experiment involved the presentation of pairs of words referring to parts of 
larger objects (e.g., attic-basement). Participants were required to judge whether the two words 
were semantically related or not. RTs were significantly faster when the words were presented in an 
iconic relation with their referents (e.g., attic presented above basement) than in a reverse-iconic 
relation (basement above attic).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 16 about here 
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Title level 3: Discussion 
The model was able to reproduce the results of the experiment with object parts. This result is based 
on some hypotheses that have relevant theoretical implications. Consider the way in which word 
learning occurs within the model. Words get associated with the sensorimotor experiences related to 
their referents. For example, learning the word “doll” implies that the representation of its phonetic 
form gets associated with the internal representations of some aspects of its referent (the object 
doll), namely the object identity within the VOT and the usually-experienced spatial location of the 
object within the PRR. Importantly, each object part, such as “head” (part of the object doll), is 
associated with both the representation(s) of its referent, i.e. the identity of the object head and its 
common location within the whole object doll, as well as with the identity of the whole object doll 
of which it is part. This implies that, due to their grounded relations during experience, for which 
one object is experienced as part of another, the words “doll” and “head” become indirectly 
associated via the grounded internal representations of the objects they refer to. 
Now, compare this mechanism with one of the most influential current proposals on the 
representation of meaning of words, the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 
1997; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998; Landauer, McNamara, Dennis, & Kintsch, 2007). This 
proposal would likely account for the representation of the part-whole relation. According to the 
LSA framework, the meanings of words are based on the co-occurrence of linguistic forms of 
words in text and speech. As a consequence the part-whole relation would be captured by the 
formation of direct links between the representations of the phonetic forms of words, and not on the 
basis of the links between representations of objects grounded in experience. Note that the aim here 
is not to criticize the LSA model: links as those proposed by LSA surely form within the brain (cf. 
Pulvermüller, 2005), and the formation of direct associations between representations of words 
likely play an important influence on their meaning and the way they are acquired. Indeed, it has 
been shown that the LSA approach is able to account for many psychological processes, such as 
semantic priming effects and memory retrieval processes (Kahana, 1996). However, the model 
proposed here is able to reproduce the targeted experimental results relying only on sensorimotor 
grounding of words. This represents an operational hypothesis on the possibility that some 
important aspects of the meaning of words, such as the whole-part relations, are based on links 
between words and grounded internal representations of object characteristics, and not only on 
verbal “word-word” associations.  
Title level 1: TRoPICALS: Comparison with other models, possible extensions 
to account for other compatibility effects, and future work 
Title level 2: TRoPICALS and related models 
Recently, the literature has proposed various neural-network models which are based on one or 
more of the four core principles incorporated in TRoPICALS. This section presents a critical review 
of some of these models, in particular of those which are more closely related to  
TRoPICALS or which tackle issues related to congruency effects. This comparison has three goals. 
First, it aims at further clarifying the nature of each of the four principles incorporated in 
TRoPICALS and at highlighting their importance for explaining higher-level cognition and, in 
particular, compatibility phenomena. Secondly, it illustrates the novelty of TRoPICALS related to 
the fact that, in contrast with other models, the four principles operate in an integrated fashion 
within it. Last, it identifies a number of relevant mechanisms exploited in other models which might 
be used to further develop TRoPICALS so as to use it to account for other compatibility effects (as 
indicated in the next two sections). Note that the reader not interested in these issues can skip this 
and the next two sections, and directly access the “Conclusions” section, as they are rather 
independent with respect to the rest of the paper. 
The review presented in the section groups the models on the basis of the principle, among the 
four principles, which is most important for them. Table 2 presents an overview of the models, in 
particular it summarises the principles they incorporate and the extent to which they satisfy the 
specific constraints of the computational embodied neuroscience approach. Each model is first 
briefly illustrated, together with its strengths and limits, and then its relevance is evaluated with 
respect to the goals mentioned above. The review starts by evaluating the strengths and limits of 
TRoPICALS itself. 
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TRoPICALS was deliberately built on the basis of the four principles and these principles work 
in a closely integrated fashion within it. In relation to the constraints of computational embodied 
neuroscience, the overall architecture of the model was constrained with specific neuroscientific 
data (see Table 1 for an overview). However, further work is needed to improve the biological 
plausibility of the micro-architecture of its constituent parts (e.g., the SOM networks used in the 
model offer only a rough functional representation of the processes taking place in the VOT and 
PFC). The model has been validated with the reproduction of the results of three psychological 
experiments. However it still requires some extensions, and to be challenged with the results of 
further experiments on compatibility effects, to soundly prove its real potential for accumulation. 
Although the model has a remarkable potential for tackling “embodied tests”, thanks to its 
integration with a sophisticated humanoid simulated participant, the experiments replicated so far 
represent a relatively modest challenge for such capability (e.g., they imply only simple “stylised” 
grasping actions), and the model architecture needs to be further developed to tackle more complex 
tasks (e.g., involving realistic grasping actions and more than 2-DOFs for reaching; specific 
mechanisms for doing this might be drawn from Caligiore et al., 2008, and Oztop & Arbib, 2002). 
Finally, learning plays an important role in the functioning of the model, and particular attention 
was spent in selecting biologically plausible learning processes (in particular motor babbling, Hebb 
learning rules, and non-supervised learning rules based on self-organisation). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Models stressing principle 1:ventral/dorsal neural 
pathways 
The FARS model (Fagg & Arbib, 1998) aims at studying the control of grasping in non-human 
primates and is strongly based on the neurophysiological findings of Sakata and Rizzolatti 
(Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995; Sakata, Taira, Murata, & Mine, 1995; Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997; Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998). The model pivots on the cortical 
area F5, part of PMC, and the anterior intraparietal cortex (AIP). According to the model, AIP 
converts the information processed by the dorsal and ventral neural pathways into a set of 
representations of different “grasp affordances”. These affordances are then forwarded to F5 where 
the most suitable one is chosen given the task constraints. 
Starting from the FARS model, Oztop and Arbib (2002) focus on the linkage between the 
perception of object-related affordances and the generation of specific grasping actions. The dorsal 
visual stream (parietal cortex) extracts parametric information about the object being attended to 
and usable for implementing actions. However, it does not ‘‘know’’ what the object is: it can only 
conceive a set of possible affordances associated with the object. The ventral stream, by contrast, 
recognizes what the object is and passes this information to PFC. The PCF can then bias F5 to 
choose the affordance appropriate to the task at hand on the basis of the organism’s current goals 
and the recognition of the nature of the object. 
The FARS model and its developments represent a fundamental milestone for the modelling of 
affordances and their underlying neural mechanisms. The model gives a very detailed account of 
the formation and selection of affordances. It also stresses the importance of the bottom-up 
formation of affordances (putatively taking place within the dorsal pathway) and the role of a top-
down pathway involving PFC allowing for selection of one of the affordances on the basis of the 
task at hand. In this respect, an important difference with TRoPICALS is that FARS has the goal of 
explaining in detail how the dorsal and ventral pathways cooperate to select the most suitable 
affordance in standard conditions. Instead, TRoPICALS aims to show how affordances are 
automatically activated both when they are useful and when they cause interferences for the task at 
hand. In this respect, the two models illustrate complementary phenomena related to affordances. 
The computational neural-network model proposed by Gupta and Noelle (2007) is based on the 
hypothesis that there are two largely distinct neural pathways that respectively guide controlled and 
automatic behaviours. The model uses the Leabra modeling framework (O’Reilly, 1996) which 
incorporates two ways of modifying the strength of connections: (a) an error correction learning 
algorithm; (b) a Hebbian correlation learning rule. The network controls a two joint planar arm to 
reproduce human experiments in which the participants had to learn sequences of key pressing on a 
keyboard of nine keys. The controlled pathway learns more rapidly than the automatic one and the 
automatic pathway in isolation cannot produce correct motor sequences. Moreover, the controlled 
pathway is able to compensate the errors of the automatic pathway. This model is particularly 
relevant as it tackles the issue of the mechanisms underlying automatic versus controlled attentive 
behaviours, and in particular the dependencies of the learning mechanisms involving them: this 
issue is closely linked with the issue of the automatic versus top-down selection of affordances 
tackled here (Miller & Cohen, 2001) and an integrated explanation of the two classes of phenomena 
should be sought in the future. 
The Infant Learning to Grasp Model (ILGM; Oztop, Bradley, & Arbib, 2004) is one of the first 
computational models on infant grasp learning constrained with data from the literature on infant 
motor development. The ILGM proposes four hypotheses about infant grasp learning: (a) infants 
acquire the skill to orient their hand towards a target during the early postnatal period rather than 
innately possessing it; (b) infants are able to acquire grasping skills before they develop an 
elaborate adult-like object visual analysis capability; (c) action opportunities afforded by the 
environment are an important factor which shapes infant grasp development; (d) the inability of 
young infants to pre-orient their hands could be explained by the lack of visual capabilities for 
extracting object affordances rather than motor immaturity (cf. Lockman, Ashmead, & Bushnell, 
1984). The model is relevant for this work for at least two reasons. First, it uses an approach 
directed to constrain models of affordances on the basis of data from developmental psychology. 
The use of this type of data might allow challenging and improving the learning processes used by 
the TRoPICALS (cf. Paletta, Fritz, Kintzler, Irran, & Dorffner, 2007). Second, it informs us on how 
to improve the realism of the model related to both the representation and development of 
affordances in the parietal-premotor pathways. For example ILGM is capable of autonomously 
developing the capability of performing various types of grasps depending on the object affordance 
(e.g., precision, power, and side grasps). 
In Borghi, Di Ferdinando and Parisi (2002) (see also Di Ferdinando & Parisi, 2004) a neural 
network model was requested to reply with different answers to the same objects in distinct 
contexts. The neural network had a feed-forward architecture formed by many layers organised in 
sequence. The simulations showed that with training the layers closer to the actuators developed 
internal activation patterns which strongly correlated with the actions to be performed. On the 
contrary, the layers closer to the sensors developed activation patterns which correlated more 
strongly with the features of objects and less so with the actions to be performed. This model is 
relevant for this work as it shows a general phenomenon for which activation patterns of areas 
closer to the output areas tend to develop representations more closely related to actions to produce 
whereas areas closer to the input areas tend to develop representations more closely dependent on 
sensations. These important gradients are not currently captured by the learning processes of 
TRoPICALS for which the different areas are either influenced by perception (VOT, PFC, AIP, and 
PRR) or by action (PMCl and PMCd). Future work should introduce more biologically plausible 
learning processes to have such gradients if they reveal important to account for some aspects of 
compatibility effects. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Models stressing principle 2: top-down biasing by 
prefrontal cortex 
Deco and Rolls (2003) describe a model based on integrate-and-fire neurons which is used to 
investigate how the neurons in the primate PFC provide a neural substrate for mapping stimuli and 
responses in a flexible fashion, based on context and rules. The behaviour of the model is compared 
with the results obtained in experiments where monkeys are requested to accomplish object or 
spatial discriminations by performing specific oculomotor responses. The model contains different 
populations of neurons (“pools”) which respond to stimulus category and position (“sensory 
pools”), or to combinations of sensory properties of stimuli (“intermediate pools”), or to responses 
(left or right; “premotor pools”). The pools are arranged hierarchically, are linked by associative 
synaptic connections, and use global inhibition, implemented via inhibitory interneurons, to 
implement competition. The model allows a direct comparison with the neurophysiological data but 
it is not tested within an embodied system. This is one of the most sophisticated models on the 
complexity and importance of PFC in performing action selection on the basis of complex contexts 
and behavioural rules. The organisation of the functions played by the ventral pathway of 
TRoPICALS is similar to that of the PFC functions of this model, but it has a larger computational 
power due to the use of Kohonen networks. 
To understand how PFC is involved in biased competitions and action selection mechanisms 
Hazy, Frank, and O'Reilly (2007) have proposed a strongly bio-constrained model (named 
“PBWM” – prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, working memory) which aims at giving an account of 
the strict relationship existing between the BG and PFC. The BG modulates PFC representations, in 
particular to activate information in working memory. This allows PFC to develop more abstract 
representations.  The algorithms used in the model are those of Leabra (see above) and a “k-
winners-take-all” algorithm (kWTA). The model is relevant as it highlights that PFC actually does 
not work in isolation but forms a whole system with the BG. Indeed, this is true not only for PFC 
but also for PMC itself as both form closely integrated parallel loops with distinct regions of the BG 
(Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 1998). These loops seem to play a fundamental role in the selection of 
actions at various levels of abstraction or, as illustrated in the model, in supporting the selection of 
the contents of working memory. In order to extend TRoPICALS to account for some compatibility 
effects it might be useful to represent BG in an explicit fashion as they can finely regulate various 
aspects of PFC bias or can endow it with working memory properties (McNab & Klingberg, 2008). 
Recently, Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009; see also Botvinick, 2008) have proposed a 
computational model of the hierarchical organisation of action within the framework of hierarchical 
reinforcement learning (HRL; Baldassarre, 2002; Barto & Mahadevan, 2003). The model proposes 
an hypothesis for which the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) could be involved in action 
selection mechanisms at an abstract level. The authors propose a possible mapping between the 
components and functions implemented by the HRL model and specific anatomical components 
and functions of the brain. In particular, they suggest a functional correspondence between the 
“actor” components of the model, on one side, and the DLPFC (this forms abstract representations 
of actions) working in synergy with the dorsolateral striatum portion of the BG (“DS”: this forms 
detailed representations of actions), on the other side. Moreover, they also suggest a functional 
correspondence between the “critic” components of the model, on one side, and the ventral striatum 
portion of the BG (VS) working in synergy with the mesolimbic dopaminergic system (involved in 
the production of learning signals), on the other side. Representations within PFC correspond to 
“option identifiers” in HRL (“options” allow a hierarchical organisation of actions at various levels 
of abstraction, from those with abstract goals, e.g. “preparing coffee”, to those with more specific 
goals, e.g. “adding sugar”) whereas DS implements the details of the selected stimulus-responses 
corresponding to option-specific action policies of the model. These mechanisms give an account of 
the role of PFC in representing actions at multiple nested levels of temporal abstraction and show 
how the prefrontal representations do not directly implement policies but instead select among 
stimulus-response pathways implemented downstream. This model is particularly important as it 
presents a biologically plausible way of implementing the trial-and-error acquisition of hierarchical 
actions, a feature which might be relevant for extending TRoPICALS in future work. Note that the 
capacity of implementing trial-and-error learning of action is a second fundamental function of the 
BG aside the aforementioned putative role in the selection of working memory contents. One or 
both functions might be implemented in TRoPICALS if accounting for some compatibility effects 
will require simulating in a more detailed way the acquisition of more complex grasping and 
reaching actions or the functioning of working memory processes. 
Polk and colleagues (Polk, Simen, Lewis, & Freedman, 2002) have developed a model to 
simulate the Tower of London task (“TOL”). This task requires human participants to move three 
coloured disks on three rods until they match a given final goal configuration. The model aims to 
understand the top-down control exerted on action by internally-generated sub-goals and an 
externally-provided final goal. The model is based on the combination of a bottom-up mechanism 
(a purely data-driven production system) and a top-down mechanism (a goal modulated system). 
The simulations were used to test a specific hypothesis about the role of the DLPFC in the TOL. 
The hypothesis suggests that this cortical area represents internally-generated sub-goals which bias 
the competition for execution of legal moves and so allow the system to achieve the final goal. This 
model is relevant as it shows that the top-down biasing of PFC can be generated by processes which 
go well beyond simple task-based biasing. For example, this may be seen in planning processes 
which recall sub-goals in working memory on the basis of previous experience or mental 
simulations. This capability of projection into the future is another fundamental property of PFC 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001) which might be relevant for accounting for other compatibility effects. 
The model proposed by Tsiotas, Borghi, and Parisi (2005) represents a first attempt to replicate 
the results of the experiment by Tucker and Ellis (2001) using a computational neural network 
model (for related neural network models replicating the compatibility effect found by Tucker & 
Ellis, 1998, see Parisi, Borghi, Di Ferdinando, & Tsiotas, 2005, and Borghi, Di Ferdinando, & 
Parisi, accepted). The model is rather abstract in that its architecture is not directly inspired by 
specific neuro-anatomical hypotheses and the arm of the simulated organism has no realistic 
dynamical properties. The model weights are updated on the basis of a genetic algorithm (Mitchell, 
1999): the results obtained with the model are based on the assumption that reaction times of real 
participants can be reproduced in terms of the number of evolutionary generations required by the 
model to develop the requested behaviours. This idea is exploited to show that learning to act in 
congruent conditions requires a lower number of generations compared to incongruent conditions. 
In incongruent condition the system has to learn to use the top-down action-selection bias related to 
the task to suppress the bottom-up action-selection signals related to objects. 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Models stressing principle 3: neural dynamic 
competitions 
The dynamic neural field approach used by Erlhagen and Schöner (2002) to simulate reaction times 
captures two important aspects which are often ignored in the simulations of reaction times based 
on classical connectionist neural networks: (a) the competitive nature of information processing in 
human brain; (b) the effects of response metrics on reaction times (e.g., the distance between the 
directions of two or more alternative pointing movements significantly affects reaction times in 
tasks where participants have to select one). As the authors show with a number of specific 
examples, these two characteristics are crucial to account for various phenomena related to RTs 
collected in experiments where body movements are important. Models based on simple feed-
forward neural networks do not have a similar expressive power. This can be seen in the fact that in 
works using these type of neural networks RTs are often reproduced in terms of output errors (e.g., 
see Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). For these reasons, we 
decided to use dynamic field neural networks in TRoPICALS to reproduce RTs. Notwithstanding 
these advantages, however, it has to be mentioned that the dynamic neural field approach has two 
important limits (cf. Pouget & Latham, 2002). First, it uses neural “maps” with a number of 
dimensions equal to the number of parameters to be represented, and as a consequence the number 
of neurons of the map increases exponentially with such number and so it soon becomes 
computationally intractable. Second, to the authors’ knowledge the dynamic field approach has 
been mainly used with networks whose connectivity is hardwired and is strongly dependent on the 
topological relations between neurons, and so its applicability is limited by these conditions. 
Neural competitive mechanisms similar to those of the dynamic field approach have also been 
used in “Boltzmann Machines” to account for two compatibility phenomena (Stoianov, Umiltà, & 
Zorzi, 2005): the Simon effect and the SNARC effect. Boltzmann Machines are neural networks 
formed by stochastic units that learn on the basis of Hebbian rules (Ackley, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 
1985). Stoianov, Umiltà, and Zorzi (2005) have used these models to show that both the Simon and 
the SNARC effect arise at the response-selection level where all input signals converge after having 
gone through different processing pathways. Although the model is not embodied and is not closely 
constrained on the basis of neuroanatomical evidence, its use of the competitive stochastic 
mechanisms of Boltzmann Machines to mimic RTs is surely one of the most interesting alternatives 
to the dynamic neural field approach. 
Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, and Patterson (1996) use a recurrent neural network where 
learning plays a key role to model domains with multiple regularities (e.g., English word reading). 
The analysis of the solutions found by the system shows how various aspects of language, such as 
word frequency and spelling-sound consistency, influence naming latencies. In these simulations 
the authors define RTs in terms of time needed by the system to reach a stable dynamical state. This 
is another alternative to the use of dynamic field networks and Boltzmann Machines for modelling 
RTs. Given their variable features (e.g., hardwired versus learned weights; topological versus 
unconstrained architecture, etc.) but also their common inherently-competitive nature, a closer 
future comparison of these methods might lead to important insights with respect to modelling 
decision making processes and RTs. 
Erlhagen and Bicho (2006) show, both theoretically and through examples, how dynamic neural 
fields can be used as a general design tool for building biologically plausible cognitive architectures 
for controlling autonomous robot. The work shows how the neural field approach can give a notable 
behavioural flexibility to robots and functions well in continuous and noisy domains. However, it 
also (implicitly) shows the limits of the approach in terms of dimensionality of the problem 
domains which can be tackled through it (see above). 
Cisek (2007) uses a dynamic neural field model to propose a general “affordance competition 
hypothesis” for action selection. According to this hypothesis, the brain processes sensory 
information to simultaneously specify several potential actions that are currently available. These 
potential actions compete against each other for further processing until a single response is 
selected. In particular, the model suggests that the dorsal visual system specifies actions that 
compete under the biasing influences provided by prefrontal regions and the basal ganglia. The 
work shows how the model can reproduce the activation of frontal motor areas found in the brain of 
real monkeys engaged in motor decision tasks. In doing so, it shows that dynamic neural field 
models capture an important property of the frontal cortex activations underlying motor decision 
making: the coincidence of the locus of the decision about which action to execute and the locus of 
the setting of the parameters of the selected action. Notice that this property is also captured by 
TRoPICALS. 
Drawing constraints from anatomical and physiological evidence from research in the motor 
system of primates, Ognibene, Rega, and Baldassarre (2006) built an embodied model to reproduce 
and account for behavioural data from monkeys that learn by trial-and-error to solve pointing tasks. 
To this purpose, the model proposes a way to integrate the dynamic neural field approach with a 
continuous reinforcement learning algorithm. Indeed, trial-and-error processes, which can be 
captured with reinforcement learning actor-critic models, are fundamental learning mechanisms for 
organisms (Barto, 1995; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Baldassarre, 2002; Mannella & Baldassarre, 2007). 
The model in particular proposes a way in which the dynamic neural field approach used in 
TRoPICALS could be extended to include trial-and-error learning processes along with the learning 
processes used here based on motor babbling and Hebb rules. This might be an important step as 
the latter mechanisms, although biologically plausible, have strong computational limits if not 
integrated with other mechanisms (Caligiore et al., 2008). 
Emphasised heading of paragraph: Models stressing principle 4: language and situated 
simulation 
The computational model proposed by Garagnani, Wennekers, and Pulvermüller (2008) 
investigates the neural mechanisms underlying results of recent EEG/MEG studies. These studies 
have revealed that brain responses to the same speech sounds differ if the stimuli are presented in 
different task contexts (Pulvermüller & Shtyrov, 2006; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, Kujala, & Näätänen, 
2004; Sinai & Pratt, 2002). The authors build a neuroanatomically-grounded neural-network model 
of the left perisylvian cortex, and use it to simulate early word acquisition processes by means of 
synaptic-weight adaptation based on a neurobiologically-realistic Hebbian learning rule. The 
network is able to autonomously form stable distributed neural representations (“cell assemblies”) 
for words and reproduces brain responses to various task contexts measured in real experiments. 
The model is first to provide a unifying account, at the cortical-circuit level, of different 
neurophysiological data on language (Pulvermüller & Shtyrov, 2006; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, 
Kujala, & Näätänen, 2004; Sinai & Pratt, 2002). In this respect, it suggests different ways in which 
the linguistic capabilities of TRoPICALS might be expanded. 
Mayor and Plunkett (2010) propose a neuro-computational account of early lexical 
development composed of two self-organising maps respectively performing object and acoustic 
categorisation. As maps emerge, associative connections between the maps are strengthened on the 
basis of the co-occurrence of objects and labels, capturing the joint attentional activities between 
infants and caregivers. Once maps have gained sufficient experience with objects and words, the 
model successfully generalises labels to novel objects of similar kind by following a single labelling 
event in a manner that resembles taxonomic responding in infants. Both the models of Garagnani 
Wennekers, and Pulvermüller (2008) and Mayor and Plunkett (2010) show how various phenomena 
involving language can be captured on the basis of associative mechanisms similar to those 
exploited here. These mechanisms are very powerful when they work in certain conditions (e.g., in 
a variety of contexts or in social environments). 
Mirolli and Parisi (2005) describe a neural network model of early language acquisition with an 
emphasis on how language can lead to the formation of more accurate internal object categories in 
the child. Language associative processes are captured with two separate networks that are 
responsible for non-linguistic sensorimotor mappings and for recognizing and repeating linguistic 
sounds. These networks form Hebbian associations between their internal layers and this captures 
the associative properties of language which link word representations to sensorimotor 
representations. The model shows that associative processes similar to those used in TRoPICALS 
allow words to recall internal representations of objects, but also that objects can recall the 
corresponding verbal representations and thus produce the corresponding phono-articulatory 
movements. The model also shows that associative processes such as those used here can cause 
phenomena which go beyond the simple associations between words and the representations of their 
referents, for example they can lead to the modification (and possibly improvement) of such 
representations. 
Cangelosi, Hourdakis, and Tikhanoff (2006) trained a neural network in a robot to exploit 
symbols received in input to reproduce as output a categorical representation of the objects the 
symbols refer to. The authors propose this system as a model of language acquisition and show how 
a robot that is guided by it is able to acquire new concepts of actions via linguistic instructions. This 
model shows that associative processes involving words and categorical representations of objects 
can be used to transfer the compositionality properties of language to sensorimotor representations. 
As flexible compositionality is a hallmark of language, the mechanisms proposed by the model 
might useful to account for some compatibility effects involving language. 
Title level 2: TRoPICALS as a general model for explaining compatibility effects 
One of the major claims of the paper is that, thanks to the generality of the four general principles it 
incorporates, TRoPICALS has the potential to account for several different experiments on 
compatibility effects. Note that this does not imply that the model can account for other 
experiments as it is, but rather that it can do so if suitably developed under various secondary 
(although important) aspects by pivoting on the four fundamental principles on which it is based. 
The potential of the principles for explaining compatibility effects derives from their synergic 
interplay within TRoPICALS. In this respect, the mechanism of the double neural route of the 
control of behaviour is an important precondition for explaining how different sources of 
information can act in synergy or in contrast. This dual route allows the biasing effect which PFC 
exerts on action selection, based on the context and the goals and needs of the participants, to 
overwrite low-level automatic tendencies when needed, for example those that are related to 
affordances. The dynamic competition mechanism leads affordances (dorsal pathway) and the 
prefrontal bias (ventral pathway) to cause different reaction times in congruent and incongruent 
conditions due to the accumulation of evidence in favour of same or different actions. Finally, the 
associative properties of language allow words to activate the related “simulations”, and this allows 
the three previous mechanisms to extend their effects to word stimuli. 
Although specific modelling work is needed to fully demonstrate the claim on the generality of 
the model, we now support it by envisaging the possible ways in which TRoPICALS can be 
extended to account for various other experiments on compatibility effects. The first type of results 
which can be modelled with TRoPICALS refer to the versions of the experiment with images where 
the target object is presented together with a second distracter object (see Ellis, Tucker, Symes & 
Vainio, 2007). This experiment aims to investigate how the speed of participants’ responses (e.g., to 
classify as either “round” or “square”, with a precision or power grip, a target 3D object generated 
on a computer screen) are influenced by the congruence or incongruence of the distracter size with 
the requested responses. An interesting result of these tests is that the congruency of the distracter 
with the target actually slows down the response to the target instead of favouring it. The authors of 
the experiment interpret these results on the basis of the involved attentional processes. Indeed, the 
experiment can be addressed with TRoPICALS by extending it with attentional capabilities which 
allow it to scan the various components of the images. If modified in this way, the model could 
account for the results on the basis of the hypothesis, suggested by the authors of the target 
experiments, for which the suppression of the perceptual processing of the distracter, and/or the 
suppression of the action automatically elicited by it, would interfere with the execution of the 
responses requested by the experiment when the stimulus and the distracter evoke similar 
affordances. 
A second type of result which can be tackled using TRoPICALS is related to the Simon effect 
(Simon, 1990; Kornblum, Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999). This refers to the phenomenon for 
which the spatial location of target stimuli can influence the reaction times of spatially defined 
responses even if the location of stimuli is irrelevant for the task. The Simon effect and the 
affordance-based compatibility effects might have some underlying mechanisms in common, in 
particular when one considers actions with a strong spatial component (e.g., reaching vs. grasping). 
Indeed, the Simon effect might be addressed with TRoPICALS by exploiting reaching capabilities 
and an overt (or covert) attention mechanism with effects similar to those exploited here to account 
for the experiment with object parts (recall that this experiment involved reaching responses). Such 
attention mechanism would give a spatial bias to action thus favouring or interfering with the 
responses requested by the experiment depending on their spatial components (cf. Stoianov, Umiltà, 
& Zorzi, 2005, and Kornblum, Stevens, Whipple, & Requin, 1999). Note that this way of modelling 
attention mechanisms is in line with an embodied vision of cognition and the “action-based view of 
attention” for which the mechanisms underlying covert attention processes, eye movements, and 
arm-hand movements are strongly related (Allport, 1987; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 
1987; Neumann, 1990; see Balkenius, 2000, for the principles that might be exploited for building 
models within an action-based view of attention, and Ognibene, Balkenius, & Baldassarre, 2008, 
for a specific model based on such principles). 
Simon effects have been also obtained with iconic/symbolic stimuli like left/right pointing 
arrows (Pellicano, Lugli, Baroni, & Nicoletti, 2009) or with biological stimuli like cartoon faces 
with their eyes gazing to the left or to the right hand side (Ansorge, 2003). These results might be 
obtained with the extensions of TRoPICALS illustrated above in relation to the Simon effect, in 
particular a top-down attention mechanism capable of driving attention to specific space locations 
with respect to the currently foveated object (see Ognibene, Balkenius, & Baldassarre, 2008, for a 
model which focuses attention and action in certain regions of space on the basis of visual cues). 
TRoPICALS also has the potential to account for correspondence effects observed when pictures 
of real objects are presented by manipulating their spatial orientations. In a typical condition 
(Tucker & Ellis, 1998; see also Glenberg et al., 2009), stimuli are pictures of graspable objects (e.g., 
a teacup) presented in an upright or inverted position and with a handle oriented to the left or right. 
Participants are instructed to press a left (or right) key using the two hands if they detect upright 
objects and a right (or left) key if they detect inverted objects while ignoring the orientation of the 
handle. The results show that the objects automatically activate reach-to-grasp actions which favour 
the responses of the hand congruent with the handle orientation (Phillips & Ward, 2002). 
TRoPICALS might account for these results on the basis of the same extensions and principles 
mentioned for the Simon effect (reaching capabilities and attention for action), and the addition of a 
second arm and a “second” dorsal pathway to control it similar to the ones used here. In fact, 
although in the experiment the objects are presented centrally, the affordances they elicit have 
spatial components, for example in relation to the direction of the motion of reaching actions 
directed to the handle positioned either on the left or on the right side of the cup. These spatial 
components might affect one-hand responses (e.g., they might affect pressing a left/right button) or 
even the use of the limbs to execute actions (e.g., left/right arm, as in Tucker & Ellis, 1998). 
Another compatibility effect which TRoPICALS might explain, which poses interesting but 
subtle challenges in the area of word semantics related to sensorimotor representations and 
evaluations, was carried out by Meier and Robertson (2004). These authors performed an 
experiment where participants were asked to evaluate words presented on a computer screen as 
either “positive” or “negative”. The authors found that evaluations of positive words were faster 
when words were presented at a top rather than at a bottom position in the screen, whereas 
evaluations of negative words were faster when words were presented at a bottom rather than at a 
top position. On this basis, the authors inferred that positive evaluations pre-activate actions 
directed to higher areas of visual space whereas negative evaluations pre-activate actions directed to 
lower areas of visual space. In order to address this experiment with TRoPICALS, one might try to 
extend it with learning processes which allow it to associate positive/negative values of words with 
the production of certain gestures (e.g. these might be socially learned, e.g. they might be gestures 
associated with movements towards high/low portions of space to express positive/negative values). 
The automatic activation of the representations of  these gestures might then facilitate or interfere 
with the execution of the actions requested by the target experiment. 
TRoPICALS has also the potential to account for the recent literature related to the 
approach/avoidance effect (see Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krath-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). 
This effect refers to the fact that positive and negative words automatically trigger approach or 
avoidance actions (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Markman & Brendl, 2005; van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 
2008). For example, Chen and Bargh (1999) found that reading positive words evokes movements 
towards one’s own body (attraction), whereas processing negative words activates avoidance 
movements (repulsion). Recent evidence demonstrated that approach/avoidance actions are defined 
in terms of their outcomes: positive words trigger actions aimed at reducing the distance with the 
stimulus, whereas negative words elicit actions that increase such distance (approach vs. avoidance 
movements; van Dantzig, Pecher, & Zwaan, 2008). In addition, Freina, Baroni, Borghi, & Nicoletti 
(2009) found that the compatibility effects between the emotional connotation of words (e.g., 
“spider” or “cake”) and the direction of arm movement found by Chen and Bargh (1999) are 
affected by the hand posture (e.g., faster RTs for triggering movements away from the body when 
the word “cake” is perceived if the hand is open than if the hand is holding a ball; faster RTs for 
triggering movements away from the body when the word “spider” is perceived if the hand is 
holding a ball than if the hand is open). TRoPICALS can potentially account for these experiments 
as the core mechanisms underlying them might be similar to those underlying the compatibility 
effects with positive/negative words. In particular, the model should be pre-trained (learning 
“during life”) to produce approach/avoidance movements (van Dantzig et al., 2008) or 
grasping/throwing-away movements (Freina, Baroni, Borghi, & Nicoletti 2009) in correspondence 
to positive (e.g., useful) objects and negative (e.g., damaging) objects, and to associate suitable 
words to the representations of objects and actions so developped. 
In summary, the different experiments on compatibility effects illustrated in this section should 
be explained in an incremental fashion through TRoPICALS by suitably improving some aspects of 
its architecture and, at the same time, by leveraging on the four principles it incorporates. In the 
long run, we expect that the effort to account for such a variety of different experiments will 
force/allow us to identify the common cognitive principles and neural mechanisms underlying 
them. This is expected to furnish increasingly comprehensive accounts of compatibility effects, to 
give an important contribution to their theoretical grasp, and to lead to the production of precise 
testable predictions. 
Title level 2: Future development of the model 
Figure 17 presents a scheme which summarises the main components and connections, and the 
corresponding putative brain areas, that TRoPICALS should be equipped with to account for the 
experiments illustrated in the previous section. Notice how this architecture is an extension of the 
architecture of the model implemented here and shown in Figure 3. The scheme highlights that one 
of the major changes of the model involves the addition of the important cognitive functionality 
related to the control of overt attention. This would involve adding a further dorsal pathway to the 
current two dedicated to the guidance of grasping and reaching actions. The existence of a dorsal 
pathway dedicated to the control of overt attention, that is the control of eye movements directed to 
identify targets for accurate visual processing, is in line with neuroscientific evidence. In monkeys, 
this pathway could be formed by the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), integrating information on the 
spatial aspects of objects with the current positioning of the eye and head, and the premotor region 
of the frontal eye field (FEF), important for the control of voluntary eye movements (Rizzolatti, 
Luppino, & Matelli, 1998; Colby & Goldberg, 1999). The human homologs of these monkey areas 
might be the “parietal eye field” region (PEF) and the same FEF (Culham & Kanwisher, 2001; 
Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002). 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 17 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Based on these components, the attention focus would be guided by both top-down and bottom-
up processes. Top down processes would guide attention based on task demands involving working 
memory processes taking place in PFC and producing effects, via suitable connections, in premotor 
cortex and parietal cortex (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Fuster, 2001; Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; 
Knudsen, 2007). Bottom-up processes would guide attention based on the perceptual saliency of the 
various regions of the scene and objects (cf. Wheeler & Treisman, 2002, and Itti & Koch, 2000, 
Knudsen, 2007, on this; see Ognibene, Balkenius, & Baldassarre, 2008, for the proposal of an 
architecture that integrates bottom-up and top-down attention processes; also see Böhme & Heinke, 
2009, for a model in which the attention focus depends on the affordances and contact points 
suitable for grasping of the objects). Attention might have the effect of enhancing the activation of 
neural representations of stimuli under the attentional focus (Fischer & Boch, 1981; Culham, 
Cavanagh, & Kanwisher, 2001; Knudsen, 2007; Gee, Ipata, Gottlieb, Bisley, & Goldberg, 2008) 
and hence might modulate the RTs due to the increased neural activation fuelling the competition 
taking place in PMCl and PMCd components of the model. 
Note that accounting for some compatibility effects might require a covert attention mechanisms 
instead of an overt one if attention operates without eye movements (e.g., possibly in Ellis, Tucker, 
Symes, & Vainio, 2007). In humans, covert attention might rely upon neural systems and 
mechanisms similar to those exploited by overt attention, as suggested by the “premotor theory of 
attention” for which covert attention is oriented to a given point when the oculomotor programme 
for moving the eyes to that point is ready to be executed (Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 
1987). As a consequence covert attention might be modelled on the basis of mechanisms similar to 
those mentioned above in relation to overt attention.  
Future development of the model might also aim to detail some components of the models which 
are currently very abstract. The first possible specification regards the current simplified 
representation of object features within AIP. This component of the model now only encodes the 
shape of objects but in brain AIP encodes a much richer range of object features together with 
important motor elements (e.g., hand-manipulation-related neurons in AIP were found to be 
sensitive to the type of grip, object size and orientation, object 3D appearance, etc., see Murata, 
Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000). These issues have been reproduced and investigated in 
models focussed on the study of affordances and grasping (Fagg & Arbib, 1998; Oztop & Arbib, 
2002; Oztop, Bradley & Arbib, 2004). Future developments of the model might develop a richer 
representation of the object features within AIP and this might help to account for some 
compatibility effects (e.g., those depending on the hand posture and state, see Freina, Baroni, 
Borghi, & Nicoletti, 2009) or it might help to find a specific mechanism to reproduce the suitable 
activations of some model components when the system performs precision or power grips (for 
example, recall that in many areas of brain precision grips produce a larger activation than power 
grips: in the model this effect is now reproduced only at a phenomenon level to avoid biasing RTs 
in wrong ways). 
Another part of the model that might be refined in future work is the PRR. This component plays 
a key role in implementing complex sensorimotor transformations which transform sensorial 
information to a suitable level of abstraction and to formats expressed in reference frames suitable 
for the motor control of limbs, body parts, and the orientation of sensors themselves (Colby, 1998; 
Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Shadmehr & Wise, 2005; Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995). 
The PRR might be refined to incorporate some of these processes if this is required to account for 
some compatibility effects, for example to model experiments where the duration of action 
execution is relevant (e.g., see Rubichi, & Pellicano 2004). 
There is also a more general issue related to the encoding of motor-related information in AIP 
and PRR. Currently, the activation patterns in most components of the model (i.e., not only in AIP 
and the PRR but also in all components of the ventral pathway) are affected by perception but not 
by action. The reason is that such representations are either hard coded (VC, SSC, STCi, STCn, 
AIP, PRR), or develop on the basis of non-supervised learning algorithms such as the Kohonen 
learning rule (VOT, PFC). In real brains such representations are heavily based on action 
(Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, Sakata, 1995; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997; Rizzolatti, 
Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987; Fuster, 2001). This might be due to both the typical bi-
directionality of brain cortico-cortical connections or to the learning processes which favour the 
emergence of action-based internal representations (e.g., supervised learning and trial-and-error 
learning). Even if this has not been reproduced yet in the current version of the model, its 
introduction is compatible with the model architecture and will be done in future work. 
Another aspect of the model which needs to be developed concerns the locus where PFC exerts a 
top-down control on action and perception. At the moment this effect is implemented only on the 
basis of direct connections of PFC with PMC. Contrary to this, in real brains these connections are 
indirect (they involve supplementary motor areas, SMA, cf. Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1998). 
Moreover, such an assumption ignores the fact that an important means through which PFC 
influences motor behaviour is represented by PFC-PC connections (Oztop, Bradley, & Arbib, 2004; 
Borra et al., 2008; Baumann, Fluet, & Scherberger, 2009). These connections might allow PC to 
contribute to select actions on the basis of the selective enhancement of some aspects of object 
affordances represented by it. This is also in line with the literature which ascribes an important role 
for attention selection mechanisms to the PFC-PC pathway (Knudsen, 2007). In general in relation 
to the issue of the early versus late control exerted by PFC on the selection of actions and 
affordances, we are in favour of the proposal of Cisek (2007) and Miller and Cohen (2001) for 
which PFC contributes to select actions at multiple stages of processing, for example both at the 
level of the PC and PMC. According to this position, further developments of the model might 
move part of the PFC influence on affordances/action selection from PMC to PC if this is relevant 
to account for some compatibility effects (e.g., those involving attention, cf. Ellis, Tucker, Symes, 
& Vainio, 2007). 
Another aspect which is currently not represented in the model concerns the possible connections 
supporting a “dialogue” between the ventral and the dorsal neural pathways before they converge 
within the frontal areas. For example, it is known that ITC has anatomical connections with some 
regions of the PC (Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider, 1994). This aspect might be taken into 
consideration in future work as it might allow overcoming of some of the limits of the current 
model, for example the current impossibility of the dorsal pathway to acquire the capacity of 
responding to objects as requested by the experimental task, and not as suggested by the object 
affordances, when the two differ. 
Similarly, the way the model mimics the associations between representations of words and 
representations of their referents is now rather abstract. In particular, the model is based on direct 
connections linking STC to PC whereas these areas might be connected only indirectly via frontal 
areas (Young, Scannell, Burns, Blakemore, 1994; Pulvermüller, 2005) or via back-connections to 
early perceptual areas (Kosslyn, 1994). This aspect of the model might be developed in future work 
to have a higher biological realism. Moreover, as already mentioned in the sections related to the 
experiments involving language, linguistic processes are represented here only on the basis of very 
simple linguistic-sensorimotor associations which cannot reproduce several important aspects of 
language, for example the effects of the formation of linguistic-linguistic associations and the fact 
that the formation and the nature of linguistic and semantic (sensorimotor) internal representations 
might strongly influence each other. 
 
Title level 1: Conclusions 
This paper presented a model, TRoPICALS, developed to provide a unified interpretation of 
compatibility effects caused by the automatic activation of neural representation corresponding to 
object affordances. The core of TRoPICALS is based on four principles: (a) the principle for which 
actions are triggered on the basis of the operation of two neural pathways, the ventral pathway 
which processes information used to support overall decisions (in particular at the level of ventro-
occipital and temporal cortex and, at a later stage, prefrontal cortex) and the dorsal pathway which 
processes information used to support the online performance of actions (in particular at the level of 
parietal and premotor cortex); (b) the principle for which the prefrontal cortex exerts a top-down 
bias on action selection guided by high-level goals, linguistic instructions, social rules, etc.; (c) the 
principle for which the selection of one action from the action repertoire is accomplished on the 
basis of a biased dynamic competition between the neural representations of such actions guided by 
the accumulation of evidence supporting them; (d) the principle for which the acoustic/visual 
representations of words are capable of reactivating sensorimotor representations normally activated 
by their referents and therefore to trigger perceptual and motor processes similar to those directly 
triggered by them. To the authors’ knowledge, and as indicated by an extensive critical review of 
other models, TRoPICALS is the first model to integrate the four principles and to exploit their 
synergic interactions to furnish a coherent account of compatibility effects. 
Thanks to the incorporation of these principles, TRoPICALS was able to replicate and provide a 
detailed account of the results obtained by Tucker and Ellis (2004) related to the congruency effect 
exhibited by real participants when dealing with object images. In particular, the dual route 
organisation of the model architecture allows the action representations automatically activated by 
object affordances via the dorsal neural pathway to either facilitate or contrast the execution of 
actions needed to accomplish the experiment and decided by the prefrontal cortex within the ventral 
pathway. This causes relatively fast or slow reaction times depending on the synergy or competition 
at the level of the premotor cortex between the two signals. 
TRoPICALS also gives an interpretation of compatibility effects obtained with nouns of objects 
(Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Borghi , Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004). The key idea underlying this account 
is that the acoustic/visual representations of words can activate associated sensorimotor 
representations in the brain (“simulations”) generated and activated by the direct interaction of the 
system with the referents of the words, and therefore they are able to produce similar compatibility 
effects. 
Following a methodological approach named computational embodied neuroscience, 
TRoPICALS was developed by taking into account four different sources of constraints directed to 
augment its biological plausibility and generality: (a) neurobiological constraints: the architecture 
of the model was constrained on the basis of neuroscientific knowledge on the cortical areas 
relevant for the performance of the target experiments; (b) behavioural constraints: the model was 
required to reproduce the results related to the behaviours exhibited by the participants of three 
experiments; (c) embodiment constraints: the model was required to function within a simulated 
artificial system equipped with a human-like visual system and an arm similar to the participants’ 
ones; (d) learning constraints: the model was required to autonomously learn to accomplish the 
experimental tests and also to acquire skills associated with object affordances (this mimicked the 
participants’ acquisition of skills before undergoing the experiments, an essential step to account for 
compatibility effects). 
As shown on the basis of a theoretical analysis, the fulfilment of these constraints, and the 
generality of the four principles it incorporates, gives TRoPICALS the potential to explain, if 
suitable developed, many other experiments on compatibility effects, for example: Simon effects 
(both with objects’ positions and with iconic or biological stimuli), correspondence effects mediated 
by both objects or language, and approach/avoidance effects. In this respect, the main contribution 
of this research is the proposition of a model which might be used both as a general theoretical 
framework and a flexible modelling tool having the potential of progressively producing a unified 
interpretation of the results of different experiments on affordance-related compatibility effects. 
 Title level 1: Appendix 
This section reports a qualitative analysis of the effects of the variation of some parameters of the 
model on the results. This analysis varied some key parameters and evaluated the resulting variation 
of the RTs on the basis of some sampling simulations. The analysis could only assess some effects 
of the manipulations of the parameters, and so can report only qualitative trends observed during 
these manipulations, as a systematic collection of data was prevented by the time length of the 
simulations (given a particular parameter setting, running all the relevant trainings and tests 
required few hours). Among the various parameters of the model, those mentioned below have the 
strongest effects on RTs. The results of the analysis can be summarised as follows: 
(a) A larger time constant τ regulating the dynamics of the speed of the competitions taking place in 
PMCl and PMCd (Equation 4) slows down all RTs. 
(b) A high decision threshold of such competition causes slow RTs; moreover, it tends to cause 
more pronounced compatibility effects. 
(c) A large width of the Gaussian function used to form clusters within PMCl and PMCd 
(Equation 3) causes clusters to overlap and so RTs become long. 
(d) A small value of the lateral inhibition between clusters within PMCl and PMCd (I of Equation 
4) tends to cause slow RTs. Too small values of this variable prevent the system from producing 
“clean” winning neuron clusters. 
(e) Maximum values of PFC-PMC connection weights have to be relatively higher than maximum 
values of PC-PMC connection weights to let PFC to always control action and overwhelm PMC in 
incompatible cases. 
(f) If the differential activation caused by small and large objects in AIP is not diminished (as done 
in the model), large and small objects produce different RTs; in particular, large objects cause faster 
RTs than small objects due to the fact that they tend to activated a larger number of neurons in AIP 
as they have a larger size, and so AIP sends a relatively larger activation to PMC.
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Table 1 
Review papers (see within them for detailed references) drawn from the neuroscientific literature on humans 
and monkeys in support of the brain neural pathways linking the various components of the model. Cortical 
areas of monkeys that are homolog to human cortical areas are indicated in brackets. Symbols: AIP: anterior 
intraparietal area; FEF: frontal eye field; PEF: posterior eye field (LIP: lateral intraparietal area); PFC: 
prefrontal cortex; PMCd: premotor cortex controlling the proximal arm (PMCd: premotor cortex, dorsal 
division; or F2: portion F2 of dorsal premotor cortex); PMCl: premotor cortex controlling the hand digits 
(F5: portion F5 of ventral premotor cortex); PRR: parietal reach region (MIP: medial intraparietal area); SSC 
somatosensory cortex; STC: superior temporal cortex; VC: visual cotex; VOT: ventral occipito-temporal 
region (ITC: inferotemporal cortex). 
 
From To References on humans References on monkeys 
VC AIP Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli (1998) 
VC PEF (LIP) Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Colby & Goldberg (1999) 
VC VOT (ITC) Grill-Spector & Malach (2004) Felleman & Van Essen (1991) 
SSC PRR (MIP) Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & 
Caminiti (1997) 
SSC PEF (LIP) Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Colby & Goldberg (1999) 
VOT (ITC) PFC Fuster (2001) Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider 
(1994) 
VOT (ITC) PC Essen, Lewis, Drury, Hadjikhani, 
Tootell, Bakircioglu, & Miller (2001) 
Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider 
(1994) 
AIP PMCl (F5) Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli (1998) 
PRR (MIP)  PMCd (PMCd or 
F2) 
Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & 
Caminiti (1997) 
PEF (LIP) FEF Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene (2002) 
Culham & Kanwisher (2001) 
Colby & Goldberg (1999) 
PFC PMC Fuster (2001) Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli (1998) 
Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & 
Caminiti (1997) 
Colby & Goldberg (1999) 
STC PFC Pulvermüller (2005)  
STC VOT Indirect pathways  
STC AIP Indirect pathways  
STC PRR Indirect pathways  
STC PEF Indirect pathways  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Models related to TRoPICALS. The table groups the models depending on which of the four principles 
incorporated in TRoPICALS they emphasise (bold “V”s highlight the grouping). Moreover, the table 
highlights the degree of attention they give to the four constraints: (a) empirical evidence on brain (Brain); 
(b) empirical evidence on behaviour (Behav.); (c) embodiment realism (Embod.); (d) reproduction of 
learning processes underlying the target behaviours (Learn.). A capital “V”, a small “v”, or an empty space 
represent respectively a large, limited, or null attention given to the principles and the constraints. 
 
 
 Principle 1: 
Ventral/ 
dorsal 
neural 
pathways 
Principle 2: 
Top-down 
biasing via 
PFC 
Principle 3: 
Neural 
dynamic 
competition 
Principle 4: 
Language 
and situated 
simulation 
B 
r 
a 
i 
n 
B 
e 
h 
a 
v. 
Em
b 
o 
d.  
L 
e 
a 
r 
n. 
TRoPICALS V V V V V V v V 
Emphasis on P1         
Fagg et al., 
(1998) 
V  V  V V   
Oztop & Arbib, 
(2002) 
V V v  V V v v 
Gupta & Noelle, 
(2007) 
V V v  V v v v 
Oztop et al., 
(2004) 
V  v  V V V v 
Borghi, Di Ferdinando & 
Parisi (2002) 
V  v   v v v 
Emphasis on P2         
Deco & Rolls, 
(2003) 
 V V  V V  V 
Hazy et al., 
(2007) 
 V v  V V  V 
Botvinick et al., 
(in press) 
 V v  V v  V 
Polk et al., 
(2002) 
 V v  V V  v 
Tsiotas et al., 
(2005) 
 V    v v v 
Emphasis on P3         
Erlhagen & Schöner, 
(2002) 
 V V  V V  v 
Stoianov et al., 
(2005) 
V  v  V V  V 
Plaut et al., 
(1996) 
  v v  v  v 
Erlhagen & Bicho, 
(2006) 
 V V  V v V v 
Cisek, 
(2007) 
V V V  V V   
Ognibene et al., 
(2006) 
  V  V V v V 
Emphasis on P4         
Garagnani et al., 
(2008) 
 V  V V V  V 
Mayor & Plunkett, 
(2010) 
   V V v  V 
Mirolli & Parisi, 
(2005) 
V   V   v V 
Cangelosi et al., 
(2006) 
   V   v v 
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Figure 1:   Abstract schema of the main functions implemented by TRoPICALS and the putative 
anatomical brain areas where they might be executed: (a) the occipital cortex and anterior parietal 
cortex which performs respectively visual pre-processing (e.g., edge detection) and somatosensory 
processing; (b) the inferior temporal cortex and the prefrontal cortex which respectively extracts 
information on identity of objects and biases action selection processes taking place in premotor 
cortex based on the current context and goal; (c) the parietal cortex and the premotor cortex which 
respectively extracts affordance information from objects and selects the desired final posture of the 
arm fingers and (sent to the muscle models, not shown in the figure); (d) the cortical areas involved 
in language processing, such as the superior temporal cortex involved in auditory processing and 
language comprehension. The graph also indicates the four main principles incorporated by the 
model.
Motor output: 
actions 
Principle 2: 
prefrontal cortex 
top-down biasing of 
affordance and 
action selection  
Linguistic input: 
current task, object name 
Visual/proprioceptive input: 
object image 
Principle 1: 
organisation of 
processing of 
information within a 
ventral and a dorsal 
neural pathways 
Principle 3: 
selection of actions 
on the basis of a 
neural dynamic 
competition 
Principle 4:  
associations between 
linguistic representations 
and simulative modal 
representations 
Premotor cortex: 
action selection 
 
 Parietal cortex: 
object shape  
and location 
Superior temporal cortex: 
linguistic processing 
Prefrontal cortex: 
influence of goals on 
affordance/action selection 
 
Inferior temporal cortex: 
object identity 
Occipital/parietal 
cortex:  
visual/somatosensory 
processing 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:   (a) The simulated arm, hand, and eye interacting with a simulated apple. (b) The 
simulated arm, hand, and eye interacting with a simulated doll. In both graphs, the line passing 
through the object indicates the gaze direction whereas the other four lines indicate the scope of the 
eye visual field. In both cases the arm and hand work on the plane.
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Figure 3:   Architecture of TRoPICALS. The boxes indicate the components of the model. The label 
inside each box indicates the type of information encoded by the component, whereas the acronym 
at its top-left corner indicates the brain anatomical area putatively corresponding to it (the acronyms 
are explained in the label of Table 1). Light and dark grey arrows respectively indicate connections 
which were hardwired and connections which were updated by learning processes based on a Hebb 
covariance learning rule or a Kohonen learning rule. The input of the model is formed by three 
RGB visual neural maps (VC) and a somatosensory map (SSC). Downstream VC and SSC, the 
model divides into two main neural pathways: the dorsal pathway, which implements suitable 
sensorimotor transformations needed to perform action on the basis of perception, and the ventral 
pathway, which allows flexible control of behaviour thanks to the biasing effects exerted by PFC on 
action selection. In turn, the dorsal pathway is formed by a pathway controlling grasping and a 
pathway controlling reaching. 
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Figure 4:   Experiment with images. The columns of this graph, from left to right, report: (a) The 
object name, appearance, and hand grip on it; (b) The activation of VC (three RGB maps) caused by 
the eight objects; (c) The activation of AIP encoding the shape of objects; (d) The activation of the 
VOT encoding the identity of objects. Notice the different grips for the different objects, the 
activations of VC caused by the variety of shape and colours of the objects, the encoding of shape 
in AIP, and the abstract representation of the identity of the objects in the VOT.
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Figure 5:   Experiment with images: angles of hand aperture stored by one simulated participant in 
correspondence to the eight objects of the experiment (note: small angles correspond to large 
apertures). Notice how the objects tend to cluster into two categories: small objects and large 
objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:   Experiment with images: activation of PFC caused by the eight different VOT 
activations (corresponding to the eight objects) and the two STCi activations (ecological condition 
experienced during life and experimental condition experienced during the psychological test). 
Notice the different representations of the various contexts and objects within PFC: the richness of 
such representations is at the basis of the potential of PFC to flexibly associate any action to any 
condition.
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Figure 7:   Experiment with images: reaction times (y-axis) versus kind of grip (x-axis). (a) Average 
reaction times exhibited by the real participants of the experiments of Tucker and Ellis (2004) 
(copyright of Elsevier, Acta Psychologica). (b) Average reaction times exhibited by the simulated 
participants. Notice the compatibility effect: large objects tend to speed up RTs of power grips 
whereas small objects tend to speed up RTs of precision grips. 
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Figure 8:   Experiment with images. (a) Activation of PMC in an incongruent trial: the biases from 
PFC and the PC cause two different clusters of neurons to compete until the cluster caused by PFC 
suppresses the cluster caused by the PC and triggers the suitable action. (b) Activation of PMC in a 
congruent trial: the biases from PFC and the PC overlap and cause the formation of only one cluster 
of neurons. The graphs report the activation of PMC after 100, 300, and 1000 ms.
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Figure 9:   Prediction of the model in relation to the experiment with images: average angles of the 
hand aperture (Thumb and Index) with incompatible objects before and after the overtraining of the 
dorsal pathway with the experimental task (recall that large angles correspond to small hand 
apertures). (a) Averages for large objects. (b) Averages for small objects. Notice how after the 
overtraining the hand aperture decreases for large objects and increases for small objects, so getting 
more similar to the responses requested by the experimental task. 
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Figure 10:   Prediction of the model in relation to the experiment with images. (a) Reaction times 
before overtraining the dorsal pathway with the experimental task. (b) Reaction times after the 
overtraining. 
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Figure 11:   Examples of activations caused by object names after 200, 600 and 1000 ms. (a) 
Experiment with words: activations caused by the name “mallet”. (b) Experiment with object parts: 
activations caused by the name “feet”. Notice the progressive activation of the areas in time. 
 
1000 ms 600 ms 200 ms 
STCn 
PRR 
VOT 
(b) 
STCn 
AIP 
VOT 
(a) 
200 ms 600 ms 1000 ms 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:   Experiment with words: reaction times (y-axis) versus kind of grip (x-axis). For 
comparison each graph also reports the reaction times of the experiment with images. (a) Average 
reaction times exhibited by the participants of the original experiments by Tucker and Ellis (2004) 
(copyright of Elsevier, Acta Psychologica). (b) Average reaction times exhibited by the simulated 
participants. Notice how the object names cause a congruency effect similar to that caused by the 
object images. 
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Figure 13:   Experiment with object parts. The columns of the figure report from left to right: (a) 
The object name and appearance; (b) The activation of VC (i.e., the three RGB maps) encoding the 
colour-based edges of the eight objects; (c) The activation of the PRR encoding the position of 
objects (note that the activation of this map differs minimally in correspondence to different 
positions of objects because the map covers the whole space reachable by the arm); (d) The 
activation of the VOT encoding the identity of objects. Notice how the PRR and the VOT represent 
respectively the position and identity of different objects in distinct ways. 
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Figure 14:   Experiment with object parts: activation of PFC caused by four different VOT 
activations (corresponding to the four object parts) and the two STCi activations (corresponding to 
the functioning of the model in the “simulated life” and during the simulated psychological 
experiment). Notice how within the VOT the object parts reactivate both their own representation 
and the representation of the whole object they belong to. 
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Figure 15:   Experiment with object parts: reaction times (y-axis) versus kind of requested answer 
(yes-is-up” and “yes-is-down”) and location of target objects (up or down). (a) Average reaction 
times exhibited by the participants of the original experiments by Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak 
(2004) (copyright of Memory & Cognition, Psychonomic Society, Inc.). (b) Average reaction times 
exhibited by the simulated participants. Notice how the positions of the buttons favour the RTs of 
the answers requested by the psychological decision task (“yes-is-up/no-is-down” or “yes-is-
down/no-is-up”) when they are spatially congruent with them, whereas they cause an interference in 
the case of incongruence. 
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Figure 16:   Prediction of the model in relation to the experiment with object parts: reaction times 
for a button located in a position corresponding to the position of an object part in two conditions: 
when the name is preceded by the presentation of a name of an object having same spatial location 
(“Congruent”) or different spatial location (“Incongruent”). The reaction times include the display 
time of the first name (800 ms). Notice how the spatial location of the object indicated by the first 
name speeds up the RTs of the answer to the second name when it is congruent with the spatial 
location of the referent of the second word, and vice-versa when it is incongruent with it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  Scheme of brain areas, functionalities, and neural pathways which compose 
TRoPICALS at the moment (areas with bold names, and connections represented with dark grey 
arrows) and those which should be added to it (areas with plain names, and internal connections 
represented with light grey arrows) in order to account for the compatibility effects investigated 
with the various experimental paradigms analysed in the text. Arrows indicating the input and 
output information flows are also reported in light grey. 
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